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Abstract 
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Economists have long speculated on why such astounding differences in the productivity 
performance exist between firms and plants within countries, even within narrowly defined sectors. 
For example, labor productivity varies dramatically even with the same five digit industry and these 
differences are often highly persistent over time
1.  
 
The focus of much applied economic research has been in “chipping away” at these productivity 
differences through better measures of inputs (capital, materials, skills, etc.). Some parts of the 
literature have attempted to see how much of the residual can be accounted for by explicit measures 
of technology such as Research and Development or Information and Communication 
Technologies
2. But technology is only one part of the story and a substantial  unexplained 
productivity differential still remains, which panel data econometricians often label as the fixed 
effects of “managerial quality” (e.g. Mundlak, 1961).  
 
While the popular press and Business Schools have long-stressed the importance of good 
management, empirical economists had relatively little to say about management practices. A major 
problem has been the absence of high quality data that is measured in a consistent way across 
countries and firms. One of the purposes of this paper is to present a survey instrument for the 
measurement of managerial practices. We collect original data using this survey instrument on a 
sample of 732 medium sized manufacturing firms in the US, UK, France and Germany. 
 
We start by evaluating the quality of this survey data. We first conduct internal validation by re-
surveying firms to interview different managers in different plants using different interviewers in the 
same firms, and find a strong correlation between these two independently collected measures. We 
then conduct external validation by matching the data with information on firm accounts and stock 
market values to investigate the association between our measure of managerial practices and firm 
performance. We find that “better” management practices are significantly associated with higher 
productivity, profitability, Tobin’s Q, sales growth rates and firm-survival rates. This is true in both 
our English-speaking countries (the UK and the US) and the Continental European countries (France 
and Germany), which suggests that our characterization of “good” management is not specific to 
Anglo-Saxon cultures. 
 
We then turn to analyzing the raw survey data and observe a surprisingly large spread in 
management practices across firms (see Figure 1). Most notably, we see a large number of firms 
who appear to be extremely badly managed with ineffective monitoring, targets and incentives. We 
also observe significant variations in management practices across our sample of countries, with US 




This raises an important question – what could rationalize such variations in management practices? 
We start by considering two pure classes of theories: the “optimal choice of management practices” 
                                                 
1 For example, Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992), Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998), Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003), 
Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005). 
2 For example, see Griliches (1979) on R&D and Stiroh (2004) on information technology.   3
whereby management practices are a choice variable determined by the firm; and the “managerial 
inefficiency” model whereby management simply reflects differences in efficiency with “worse” 
management practices predicted to be associated with lower profitability. We find some evidence for 
both models. 
 
We then investigate what determines the variation in these management practices across firms and 
countries. The two factors that appear to play an important role are product market competition and 
family firms. First, higher levels of competition (measured using a variety of different proxies such 
as trade openness) are strongly and robustly associated with better management practices. This 
competition effect could arise through a number of channels, including the more rapid exit of badly 
managed firms and/or the inducement of greater managerial effort.
3 Secondly, family-owned firms 
in which the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is chosen by primo geniture (the eldest male child) tend 
to be very badly managed. Family ownership could have beneficial effects from the concentration of 
ownership as this may overcome some of the principal-agent problems associated with dispersed 
ownership. In our data, we find family ownership combined with professional management (i.e. 
where the CEO is not a family member) has a mildly positive association with good managerial 
practices. The impact of family ownership and management is more ambiguous, however, with 
positive effects from reducing the principal-agent problem but negative effects due to more limited 
selection into managerial positions as well as the “Carnegie effect”.
4 We find that companies who 
select the CEO from all family members are no worse managed than other firms, but those who 
select the CEO based on primo geniture are very poorly managed. 
 
The impact of competition and family firms is quantitatively important. Low competition and primo 
geniture family firms account for about half of the tail of poorly performing firms. Across countries 
competition and family firms also play a large role, accounting for as much as two- thirds of the gap 
in management practices between the US and France and one third of the gap between the US and 
the UK. One reason is that European competition levels are lower than in the US. Another reason is 
that primo geniture is much more common in France and the UK due to their Norman heritage, in 
which  primo geniture was legally enforced to preserve concentrated land-holdings for military 
support. More recently, Britain and other European countries have also provided generous estate tax 
exemptions for family firms. 
 
Our work relates to a number of strands in the literature. First, our findings are consistent with recent 
econometric work looking at the importance of product market competition in increasing 
productivity.
5 It has often been speculated that these productivity-enhancing effects of competition 
work through improving average management practices and our study provides support for this 
view. Second, economic historians such as Landes (1969) and Chandler (1994) have claimed that the 
relative industrial decline of the UK and France in the early Twentieth Century was driven by their 
emphasis on family management, compared to the German and American approach of employing 
professional managers.
6 Our results suggest this phenomenon is still important almost a century 
                                                 
3 Other possible mechanisms include the learning effect, whereby higher competition involving more firms within the 
same industry allows firms to learn superior management practices more quickly.  
4 The “Carnegie effect” is named after the great philanthropist Andrew Carnegie who claimed, “The parent who leaves 
his son enormous wealth generally deadens the talents and energies of the son, and tempts him to lead a less useful and 
less worthy life than he otherwise would”. See also Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993). 
5 There are a very large number of papers in this area but examples of key contributions would be Syverson (2004a,b), 
Olley and Pakes (1996) and Nickell (1996) 
6 See also the recent literature on family firms and performance, for example Morck et al. (2005), Bertrand et al (2005), 
Perez-Gonzalez (2005), and Villalonga and Amit (2005).   4
later. A third related strand is the work on the impact of Human Resource Management (HRM)
7 that 
also finds that these management practices are linked to firm performance. Finally, there is the 
recent contribution of Bertrand and Schoar (2003), who focus on the impact of changing CEOs and 
CFOs in very large quoted US firms. This will tend to reflect the impact of management styles and 
strategies, complementing our work emphasizing the practices of middle management.
8 We see 
management practices as more than the attributes of the top managers: they are part of the 
organizational structure and behavior of the firm, typically evolving slowly over time even as CEOs 
and CFOs come and go. 
 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section II discussed why management practices could vary, 
section III discusses measuring management practices the management data, and section IV details 
the empirical model and the results. In section V, we discuss the distribution of management 
practices and offer evidence on the causes for the variations in management. In section VI, we pull 
this all together to try to explain management practices across firms and countries. Finally, some 
concluding comments are offered in section VII. More details of the data, models and results can be 
found in the Appendices. 
 
II. MODELS OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
We consider two classes of theories of why good management practices will vary across firms. We 
will later show evidence that both appear important, but consider the pure form of each theory to 
generate clear predictions we can take to the data. We characterize the first set of models as the 
“optimal choice of management practices” and the second set of models as “managerial 
inefficiency”. 
 
IIA. Optimal choice of management practices 
 
A conventional economic approach is to consider management as a choice variable for the firm. 
Improving management practices may be a costly activity and the firm will weigh these costs against 
the future expected benefits. There is nothing inefficient about “worse” management practices: firms 
have simply chosen the optimal level. For example, middle managers may prefer to trade-off lower 
levels of effort and monitoring by the corporate head quarters in return for a lower compensation 
package. This perspective covers a large range of models from those where firms can perfectly 
control managerial inputs just as surely as any other factor of production to models where firms can 
influence managerial effort indirectly through contract choice.  
 
Consider a basic parameterization of this type of model. Define M as an indicator of overall 
management practices which is an increasing function of two individual practices, M = h(M1,M2), 
where M1 and M2 could be thought of respectively as human capital management (performance 
based promotions etc.) and fixed capital management (shop floor operations etc.). For simplicity we 
ignore all other factors of production. We then write the production function in the following CES 
form: 
 
                                                 
7 For example, Bartel et al (2005), Ichinowski et al. (1997), Lazear (2000) and Black and Lynch (2001). 
8 In a sub-sample of 59 companies we piloted questions on the hierarchical structure of the firm and found the average 
number of levels to the shop floor was 5.03 for the CEO versus 2.78 for the plant managers (our target management 
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where σ is the elasticity of substitution is (which we assume is greater than unity) and  1 B >0 and 
2 B >0  are parameters. Profits are written as: 
 
2 2 1 1 ' M M X W PY ρ ρ − − − = Π                                                             (2) 
 
where P is the price of output, W is the unit cost vector for inputs X and  j ρ  is the unit cost of 
managerial practice  j M .  
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From (3) we can see that each individual practice is also decreasing in the cost of the practice and 
increasing in the technological parameter ( j B ). Combining the first order conditions for the two 

































σ                                                          (4) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the relative demand for the practices is decreasing in the relative costs and 
increasing in the relative benefits. Prices and technologies of the management practices are not 
observable but are likely to be systematically different by industry. For example, if  1 M represents a 
human capital focused practices and  2 M  represents a fixed capital practices we would expect B1/B2 
to be larger in the more highly skilled sectors. This is something that we examine empirically 
correlating the relative use of different types of management practices with proxies for the relative 
importance of skills. 
 
 
II.B Managerial inefficiency  
 
An alternative view of the variation in management practices is that it simply reflects differences in 
efficiency. A representation of this process is that there are exogenous differences in management 
quality between firms and these are not openly traded on markets – examples include Lucas (1978) 
and Mundlak’s (1961) fixed effects. In this set-up, we could consider a production function of the 
form: 
 
) ( ) ( X F M A Y =                                                                   (5) 
   6
where A(M) represents total factor productivity which is increasing in management and the X are a 
vector of conventional inputs such as labour, capital and materials with F(.) is increasing in X. As 
with the previous model, an obvious empirical implication of (5) is the productivity is increasing in 
the quality of management practices. 
 
The associated profits are:  
 




A possible distinction between the two pure forms of the models is the relationship between 
management practices and profits: if poor management were purely an optimal choice with no 
exogenous efficiency differences between firms, then badly managed firms should be no less 
profitable than well-managed firms. If instead poor management causes lower efficiency (A), then 
better management should be associated with higher profitability. Accounting profits may differ 
from true economic profits, however, so we also consider the relationship between stock market 
values and management. In a dynamic setting, under the managerial efficiency view firms with bad 
management should also be more likely to exit the market and to grow more slowly. We also 
examine these predictions, paying attention to the issue of the endogeneity. 
 
 
II.C Management and Product Market Competition 
 
Both optimal choice and efficiency models also have implications for the relationship between 
product market competition and management. 
 
The most obvious effect of competition on management is through a Darwinian selection process in 
the “management inefficiency” model. Higher product market competition will drive inefficient 
firms out of the market and allocate greater market share to the more efficient firms. Syverson 
(2004a,b) focuses on productivity and offers supportive evidence of these predictions in his analysis 
of the US cement industry, finding that tougher competition is associated with a higher average level 
of productivity with a lower dispersion of productivity as the less efficient tail of firms have been 
selected out.
9 Therefore, we expect a better average level and more compressed spread of 
management practices in environments that are more competitive.  
 
Natural variation in management practices will arise in equilibrium if entrepreneurs found firms with 
distinctive cultures that are deeply embedded and hard to change. They do not know exactly how 
well their firm will perform until they enter a market and compete with other firms. Over time, they 
learn about the quality and suitability of their management practices and decide whether to continue 
operating in the market (Jovanovic, 1982). A more general model would allow best management 
practice to be stochastically evolving over time with firms continually innovating, generating a 
spread even across long-lived incumbents (e.g. Klette and Kortum, 2004). 
 
                                                 
9 An alternative specification is perfect competition between incumbents within markets but a fixed cost of entry, such at 
Hopenhayn (1992). In his specification lower costs of entry also supports a higher average level and a lower dispersion 
of productivity.   7
Under the “optimal choice” approach there are models where higher competition could increase the 
incentives to provide greater managerial effort (or higher investments in quality). In Appendix E we 
set up a simple Bertrand differentiated product model to show some of the forces at play. We allow 
firms to choose contracts with managers after they have entered the market, but before their 
marginal costs are revealed. Marginal costs are an outcome of managers’ (unobservable) efforts and 
a cost shock. “Investing in managerial effort” is essentially choosing a higher-powered incentive 
contract that will elicit more effort (better managerial practices) but at the cost of giving away more 
of the firm’s profits to the manager.  For a given number of firms an increase in competition 
(indexed in the model by a decrease in product substitutability) has an ambiguous effect on 
managerial effort. On the one hand, higher competition should increase firm incentives to promote 
managerial effort because any unit cost reduction will have a larger effect on market share. On the 
other hand, rents are lower when competition is higher, so the profit increase from any increase in 
market share is less valuable. However, when we allow entry to be endogenous there is fall in the 
number of firms who choose to enter the market because profits are lower. In a free entry long-run 
equilibrium firms will be larger on average. This means they have a greater desire to cut marginal 
costs through higher managerial effort. In the context of this simple model (which follows Raith, 
2003), once we allow for endogenous market structure an increase in product market competition 
unambiguously increases management effort
10.  
 
The result that increased product market competition should improve incentives for managerial 
practices are reasonably robust, but not completely general. Vives (2005) shows that providing the 
market for varieties does not shrink the result goes through under the Bertrand competition 
considered in Appendix E for a wide number of assumptions over the form of consumer utility. The 
conditions for Cournot are more exacting, but will hold so long as output reaction functions are 
downward sloping, which is the standard case. 
 
The empirical prediction that we take to the data is that tougher competition should clearly be related 
to better management in the managerial inefficiency model. The relationship is more ambiguous in 
some optimal choice models, but is also likely to be positive. 
 
 
II.D Family ownership and family management 
 
The managerial inefficiency model has implications for the relationship between management and 
family firms, since these provide a potential rationale for the continued existence of badly managed 
firms. Family ownership can shield inefficient firms from competition if the owners are prepared to 
accept a below market rate of return to capital because of the amenity value attached to having the 
family’s name associated with the company.  
 
There has been much recent work on the efficiency of family firms. Family firms are the typical 
form of ownership and management in the developing world and much of the developed world
11. As 
Table 1 shows in our sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms (see section III for details) 
family involvement is common. In around thirty per cent of European firms and ten per cent of 
                                                 
10 Schmidt (1997) allows bankruptcy costs in a principal agent model with Cournot competition. With risk neutrality, but 
a wealth-constrained manager the fear of bankruptcy will increase the incentive of the manager to supply effort. 
Nevertheless, the rent reducing effect of competition will still exist and this could be large enough to completely offset 
the fear of bankruptcy. It is allowing the endogeneity of entry that makes a substantial difference to the comparative 
statics in the model in Appendix E.  
11 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) and Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005).   8
American firms the largest shareholding block is a family (defined as the second generation or 
beyond from the company’s founder). This is similar in broad magnitude to the findings of La Porta 
et al. (1999), who report about forty per cent of medium sized firms were family-owned in Europe 
and about ten per cent were family-owned in the US.
12 Interestingly, we see in the second row that 
many of these firms have a family member as CEO, suggesting families are reluctant to let 
professional managers run their firms. In the third row, we see in the UK and France around two 
thirds of these CEOs are chosen by primo geniture (succession to the eldest son) representing around 
fifteen per cent of the total sample. In Germany and the US this only occurs in about one third of the 
family firms representing only three per cent of the sample. In rows 4 and 5, we look at founder 
firms – those companies where the largest current shareholder is the individual who founded the 
firm. We see that founder firms are also common in the UK and France, as well as in the US, 
although much less so in Germany.
 
One rationale for these differences in types of family involvement across countries is the historical 
traditions of Feudalism, particularly in the Norman societies of the UK and France. This appears to 
have persisted long after the Norman kingdoms collapsed, with primo geniture obligatory under 
English law until the Statute of Wills of 1540 and de facto in France until the introduction of the 
Napoleonic code in the early 1800s.
13 German traditions were based more on the Teutonic principle 
of gavelkind (equal division amongst all sons); while in the US, primo geniture was abolished after 
the Revolution with equal treatment by birth order and gender by the middle of the 20
th century 
(Menchik, 1980). A second potential rationale for these differences is the structure of estate taxation, 
which for a typical medium sized firm worth $10m or more, contains no substantial family firm 




The theoretical implications of family ownership depend on the extent of involvement in 
management. Family ownership per se may have advantages over dispersed ownership because the 
(concentrated) ownership structure may lead to closer monitoring of managers (e.g. Berle and 
Means, 1932)
15. Under imperfect capital markets, founders will find it difficult to sell off the firm to 
outside investors (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2002). Furthermore, when minority investor rights are not 
well protected, it may be difficult to diversify ownership. 
 
                                                 
12 La Porta et al. (1999) define family “ownership” as controlling 20% or more of the equity,  “medium sized” as those 
with common equity of just above $500m; and “family” as including founder owned firms. Including “founder” firms in 
our definition would increase “family” ownership to about 45% in Europe and 25% in the US, higher then their numbers, 
although our “medium sized” firms are smaller. The main points to note is that family firms are common in the OECD, 
particularly so in Continental Europe.  
13 While Napoleonic inheritance code enforced the equal division of property, it was more flexible with companies. In 
fact, a common route to pass property on to a single heir in France is to place this within a company. In England primo 
geniture is also still common, with for example, the 2005 Oxford English Dictionary stating that it is “still prevailing in 
most places in a modified form”. 
14 For political economy reasons these generous estate taxes could have arisen endogenously from the power blocs of 
politically connected family firms. Of course, estate tax can be reduced by tax planning, but this usually involves 
advanced planning, financial costs and some loss of control.  
15 Bennedsen et al. (2005) list a range of additional potential benefits (and costs) of family ownership, although these are 
likely to be less important than those discussed in the main text. The benefits include working harder due to higher levels 
of shame from failure, trust and loyalty of key stakeholders, and business knowledge from having grown up close to the 
firm. The costs include potential conflicts between business norms and family traditions.   9
Even though a firm is family owned, outside professional managers can be appointed to run the firm 
as is common in the US and Germany. Combining family ownership with family management has 
several potential costs. Selecting managers from among the pool of family members will lower the 
average human capital of the managerial cadre, as there is less competition for senior positions. 
Furthermore, the knowledge that family members will receive management positions in future may 
generate a “Carnegie effect” of reducing their investment in human capital earlier in life. These 
selection and Carnegie effects are likely to be much more negative for primo geniture family firms 
in which the eldest son is destined to control the firm from birth. On the other hand, principal-agent 
problems may be mitigated from combining ownership and control. There may also be investment in 
firm-specific human capital if the owners’ children expect to inherit the family firm. So ultimately, 
the impact of family firms on management practices is an empirical matter. 
 
Of course, family-owned firms should have strong incentives to optimally balance off these factors 
before deciding on using family or external managers. However, family-owned firms may choose 
family management even though this is sub-optimal for company performance because family 
members receive “amenity potential” from managing the family firm, which often bears the family 
name and has been managed by several previous generations (Bukhart et al, 1998). In this case, the 
family may accept lower economic returns from their management in return for the private utility of 
managerial control. Indeed, the desire to retain family management may also be a reason for the 
refusal of family owners to sell equity stakes in the company to outsiders. 
 
The evidence on inherited family firms suggests that family ownership has a mixed effect on firm 
profitability, but family management has a substantially negative effect
16. Our approach in this paper 
is to examine directly the impact of family firms on management practices rather than only look at 
firm performance measures. Although there may be some endogeneity problems with the family 
firms “effect” on management, these selection effects seem to cause OLS estimates to underestimate 
the damage of family involvement in management. This is because empirically family firms are 
more likely to involve professional managers when the firm has suffered a negative shock (see 
Bennedsen et al. 2005).
17  
 
Family firms can account for why “exogenously inefficient” firms can persist even in competitive 
markets: family owners are prepared to take a below market return on capital because of the amenity 
value of having the family name attached to the company. It is hard to understand why there should 
be any systematic relationship between family firms and managerial practices under the pure 
“optimal choice” model.
18  
                                                 
16 See for example Perez-Gonzalez (2005), and Villalonga and Amit (2005). 
17 Bennedsen et al (2005) construct a large dataset of 6,000 Danish firms, including information on the gender of the first 
born child, which they use as an instrumental variable to predict whether firms remaining under family management 
after a succession.  
18 One version of the optimal choice hypothesis is that firms could offer contracts with lower wages and worse 
management (e.g. less risk of firing, lower effort). This compensating differential would vary depending on the firm’s 
technology and environment. Possibly, primo geniture firms may prefer offering these types of contracts, although it is 
hard to see why firms in the same industry, same size and age would differ dramatically in this respect purely because of 
their family status. 
   10
 
III. MEASURING MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
To investigate these issues we first have to construct a robust measure of management practices 
overcoming three hurdles: scoring management practices, collecting accurate responses, and 
obtaining interviews with managers. We discuss these issues in turn. 
 
 
III.A Scoring Management Practices 
 
To measure management requires codifying the concept of “good” and “bad” management into a 
measure applicable to different firms across the manufacturing sector. This is a hard task as good 
management is tough to define, and is often contingent on a firm’s environment. Our initial 
hypothesis was that while some management practices are too contingent to be evaluated as “good” 
to “bad”, others can potentially be defined in these terms, and it is these practices we tried to focus 
on in the survey. 
 
To do this we used a practice evaluation tool developed by a leading international management 
consultancy firm. In order to prevent any perception of bias with our study we chose to receive no 
financial support from this firm.  
 
The practice evaluation tool defines and scores from one (worst practice) to five (best practice) 
across eighteen key management practices used by industrial firms. In Appendix A (Table A1) we 
detail the practices and the questions in the same order as they appeared in the survey, describe the 
scoring system and provide three anonymous responses per question. These practices can be grouped 
into four areas: operations (3 practices), monitoring (5 practices), targets (5 practices) and incentives 
(5 practices). The operations management section focuses on the introduction of lean manufacturing 
techniques, the documentation of processes improvements and the rationale behind introductions of 
improvements. The monitoring section focuses on the tracking of performance of individuals, 
reviewing performance (e.g. through regular appraisals and job plans), and consequence 
management (e.g. making sure that plans are kept and appropriate sanctions and rewards are in 
place). The targets section examines the type of targets (whether goals are simply financial or 
operational or more holistic), the realism of the targets (stretching, unrealistic or non-binding), the 
transparency of targets (simple or complex) and the range and interconnection of targets (e.g. 
whether they are given consistently throughout the organization). Finally, the incentives section 
includes promotion criteria (e.g. purely tenure based or including an element linked to individual 
performance), pay and bonuses, and fixing or firing bad performers, where best practice is deemed 
the approach that gives strong rewards for those with both ability and effort. A subset of the 
practices has similarities with those used in studies on HRM practices. 
 
Since the scaling may vary across practices in the econometric estimation, we convert the scores 
(from the 1 to 5 scale) to z-scores by normalizing by practice to mean zero and standard deviation 
one. In our main econometric specifications, we take the unweighted average across all z-scores as 
our primary measure of overall managerial practice, but we also experiment with other weightings 
schemes based on factor analytic approaches. 
   11
There is scope for legitimate disagreement over whether all of these measures really constitute 
“good practice”. Therefore, an important way to examine the externality validity of the measures is 
to examine whether they are correlated with data on firm performance constructed from company 
accounts and the stock market. We also examine whether the relationship between management 
practices and productivity is weaker in the Continental European nations to check for any “Anglo-
Saxon” bias in our management scores. 
 
 
III.B Collecting Accurate Responses 
 
With this evaluation tool we can, in principle, provide some quantification of firms’ management 
practices. However, an important issue is the extent to which we can obtain unbiased responses to 
our questions from firms. In particular, will respondents provide accurate responses? As is well 
known in the surveying literature (see, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) a 
respondent’s answer to survey questions is typically biased by the scoring grid, anchored towards 
those answers that they expect the interviewer thinks is “correct”. In addition, interviewers may 
themselves have pre-conceptions about the performance of the firms they are interviewing and bias 
their scores based on their ex-ante perceptions. More generally, a range of background 
characteristics, potentially correlated with good and bad managers, may generate some kinds of 
systematic bias in the survey data. 
 
To try to address these issues we took a range of steps to obtain accurate data when we administered 
the survey in the summer of 2004.   
 
First, the survey was conducted by telephone without telling the managers they were being scored.
19 
This enabled scoring to be based on the interviewer’s evaluation of the firm’s actual practices, rather 
than their aspirations, the manager’s perceptions or the interviewer’s impressions.
20 To run this 
“blind” scoring we used open questions (i.e. “can you tell me how you promote your employees”), 
rather than closed questions (i.e. “do you promote your employees on tenure [yes/no]?”). These 
questions target actual practices and examples, with the discussion continuing until the interviewer 
can make an accurate assessment of the firm’s typical practices. For each dimension, the first 
question is broad with detailed follow-up questions to fine-tune the scoring. For example, in 
dimension (1) Modern manufacturing introduction the initial question is “Can you tell me about 




Second, the interviewers did not know anything about the firm’s financial information or 
performance in advance of the interview. This was achieved by selecting medium sized 
manufacturing firms and by providing only firm names and contact details to the interviewers (but 
no financial details). These smaller firms (the median size was 700 employees) would not be known 
by name and are rarely reported in the business media. The interviewers were specially trained 
graduate students from top European and US business schools, with a median age of twenty-eight 
                                                 
19 This survey tool has been passed by Stanford’s Human Subjects Committee. The deception involved was deemed 
acceptable because it is: (i) necessary to get unbiased responses; (ii) minimized to the management practice questions 
and is temporary (we send managers debriefing packs afterwards); and (iii) presents no risk as the data is confidential. 
20 If an interviewer could not score a question it was left blank, with the firm average taken over the remaining questions. 
The average number of un-scored questions per firm was 1.3%, with no firm included in the sample if more than three 
questions were un-scored. 
21 Minimizing inventory levels is one of the key components of modern manufacturing.   12
and five years prior business experience in the manufacturing sector
22. All interviews were 
conducted in the manager’s native language. 
 
Third, each interviewer ran over 50 interviews on average, allowing us to remove interviewer fixed 
effects from all empirical specifications. This helps to address concerns over inconsistent 
interpretation of categorical responses (see Manski, 2004), standardizing the scoring system. 
 
Fourth, the survey instrument was targeted at plant managers, who are typically senior enough to 
have an overview of management practices but not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day 
operations of the enterprise.  
 
Fifth, we collected a detailed set of information on the interview process itself (number and type of 
prior contacts before obtaining the interviews, duration, local time-of-day, date and day-of-the 
week), on the manager (gender, seniority, nationality, company and job tenure, internal and external 
employment experience, and location), and on the interviewer (we can include individual 
interviewer-fixed effects, time-of-day and subjective reliability score). Some of these survey 
controls are significantly informative about the management score (see Appendix C and Table C1)
23, 
and when we use these as controls for interview noise in our econometric evaluations the coefficient 
on the management score typically increased. 
 
 
III.C Obtaining Interviews with Managers 
 
The interview process took about fifty minutes on average, and was run from the London School of 
Economics. Overall, we obtained a relatively high response rate of 54%, which was achieved 
through four steps. First, the interview was introduced as “a piece of work”
24 without discussion of 
the firm’s financial position or its company accounts, making it relatively uncontroversial for 
managers to participate. Interviewers did not discuss financials in the interviews, both to maximize 
the participation of firms and to ensure our interviewers were truly “blind” on the firm’s financial 
position. Second, questions were ordered to lead with the least controversial (shop-floor operations 
management) and finish with the most controversial (pay, promotions and firings). Third, 
interviewers’ performance was monitored, as was the proportion of interviews achieved, so they 
were persistent in chasing firms (the median number of contacts each interviewer made in setting up 
the interview was 6.4). The questions are also about practices within the firm so any plant managers 
can respond, so there are potentially several managers per firm who could be contacted
25. Fourth, the 
written endorsement of the Bundesbank (in Germany) and the Treasury (in the UK), and a scheduled 
presentation to the Banque de France, helped demonstrate to managers this was an important 
exercise with official support.  
                                                 
22 Thanks to the interview team of Johannes Banner, Michael Bevan, Mehdi Boussebaa, Dinesh Cheryan, Alberic de 
Solere, Manish Mahajan, Simone Martin, Himanshu Pande, Jayesh Patel and Marcus Thielking. 
23 In particular, we found the scores were significantly higher for senior managers, when interviews were conducted later 
in the week and/or earlier in the day. That is to say, scores were highest, on average, for senior managers on a Friday 
morning and lowest for junior managers on a Monday afternoon. By including information on these characteristics in our 
analysis, we explicitly controlled for these types of interview bias. 
24 Words like “survey” or “research” should be avoided as these are used by switchboards to block market research calls. 
25 We found no significant correlation between the number, type and time-span of contacts before an interview is 
conducted and the management score. This suggests while different managers may respond differently to the interview 
proposition this does not appear to be directly correlated with their responses or the average management practices of the 
firm.   13
 
III.D Sampling Frame and Additional Data 
 
Since our aim is to compare across countries we decided to focus on the manufacturing sector where 
productivity is easier to measure than in the non-manufacturing sector. We also focused on medium 
sized firms selecting a sample where employment ranged between 50 and 10,000 workers (with a 
median of 700). Very small firms have little publicly available data. Very large firms are likely to be 
more heterogeneous across plants, and so it would be more difficult to get a picture of managerial 
performance in the firm as a whole from one or two plant interviews. We drew a sampling frame 
from each country to be representative of medium sized manufacturing firms and then randomly 
chose the order of which firms to contact (see Appendix B for details).  We also excluded any clients 
of our partnering consultancy firm from our sampling frame
26. 
 
In addition to the standard information on management practices, we also ran two other surveys. 
First, we collected information from a separate telephone survey on the Human Resource department 
on the average characteristics of workers and managers in the firm such as gender, age, proportion 
with a college degree, average hours, holidays, sickness, occupational breakdown and a range of 
questions on the organizational structure of the firm and the work-life balance. The details of this 
questionnaire are provided in Appendix A3. Second, we collected information from public data 
sources and another telephone survey in summer 2005 on family ownership, management and 
succession procedures, typically answered by the CEO or his office. The details of this questionnaire 
are provided in Appendix A4. 
 
Quantitative information on firm sales, employment, capital, materials etc. came from the company 
accounts and proxy statements, while industry level data came from the OECD. The details are 
provided in Appendix B.  
 
Comparing the responding firms with those in the sampling frame, we found no evidence that the 
responders were systematically different on any of the performance measures to the non-responders. 
They were also statistically similar on all the other observables in our dataset. The only exception 
was on size where our firms were slightly larger than average than those in the sampling frame. 
 
 
III.E Evaluating and Controlling for Measurement Error  
 
The data potentially suffers from several types of measurement error that are likely to bias the 
association of firm performance with management towards zero. First, we could have measurement 
error in the management practice scores obtained using our survey tool. To quantify this we 
performed repeat interviews on 64 firms, contacting different managers in the firm, typically at 
different plants, using different interviewers. To the extent that our management measure is truly 
picking up general company-wide management practices these two scores should be correlated, 
while to the extent the measure is driven by noise the measures should be independent. 
 
Figure 2 plots the average firm level scores from the first interview against the second interviews, 
from which we can see they are highly correlated (correlation 0.734 with p-value 0.000). 
Furthermore, there is no obvious (or statistically significant) relationship between the degree of 
measurement error and the absolute score. That is to say, high and low scores appear to be as well 
                                                 
26 This removed 33 firms out of our sampling frame of 1,353 firms   14
measured as average scores, and firms that have high (or low) scores on the first interview tend to 
have high (or low) scores on the second interview. Thus, firms that score below two or above four 
appear to be genuinely badly or well managed rather than extreme draws of sampling measurement 
error. 
 
 Analyzing the measurement error in more detail (see Appendix C), we find that the question level 
measures are noisier, with 42% of the variation in the scores due to measurement error, compared to 
the average firm’s scores with 25% of the variation due to measurement error. This improved signal-
noise ratio in the firm level measure – which is our primary management proxy - is due to the partial 
averaging out of measurement errors across questions. 
 
The second type of measurement error concerns the fact that our management practices cover only a 
subset of all management practices that drive performance. For example, our interviews did not 
contain any questions on management strategy (such as merger and acquisition strategy). However, 
so long as firms’ capabilities across all management practices are positively correlated - which they 
are significantly within the eighteen practices examined - then our measure based on a subset of 
practices will provide a proxy of the firm’s true management capabilities. Again, however, this 
suggests that the coefficients we estimate on management in the production function are probably 
biased towards zero due to attenuation bias.  
 
IV. MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Before we investigate the reasons for the spread of management practices across firms it is worth 
evaluating whether these practices are correlated with firm performance. The purpose of this 
exercise is not to directly identify a causal relationship between our management practice measures 
and firm performance. It is rather an external validity test of the survey measurement tool to check 
that the scores are not just “cheap talk” but are actually correlated with quantitative measures of firm 
performance from independent data sources on company accounts, survival rates and market value.  
 
 
IV.A Econometric Modeling 
 





















it u z M n k l y + + + + + = ' γ β α α α                                                            (7) 
 
where Y = deflated sales, L = labor, K = capital and N = intermediate inputs (materials) of firm i at 
time t in country c (note that we generally allow country specific parameters on the inputs) and 
lower case letters denote natural logarithms y = ln(Y), etc. The z’s are a number of other controls that 
will affect productivity such as workforce characteristics
27 (the proportion of workers with a degree, 
the proportion with MBAs and the average hours worked), firm characteristics (firm age, whether 
the firm is listed), a complete set of three digit industry dummies and country dummies.  
                                                 
27 We experimented with a wide range of workforce characteristics such as gender, worker age and unionization. We 
only found human capital to be statistically significant after controlling for firm characteristics.   15
 
The crucial variable for us is management practices denoted M. Our basic measure takes z-scores of 
each of the eighteen individual management questions and then averages over the variables to get M. 
We experimented with a number of other approaches including using the primary factor from factor-
analysis and using the raw average management scores and found very similar results.  
 
The most straightforward approach to estimating equation (7) is to simply run OLS in the cross 
section (or on the panel with standard errors clustered by company) and assume that all the 
correlated heterogeneity is captured by the control variables. Since we have panel data, however, an 
alternative is to implement a two-step method where we estimate the production function in stage 
one and then estimate the “permanent” component of total factor productivity (i.e. the fixed effect of 
TFP). We then project the permanent component of productivity on the management scores in a 
separate second step. This is the approach Black and Lynch (2001) followed in a similar two-step 
analysis of workplace practices and productivity. We estimate the production function in a variety of 
ways. The simplest method is within groups – i.e. including a full set of firm dummies. We compare 
this to “System GMM” (see Blundell and Bond, 2000) approach that also allows for the endogeneity 
of the time varying inputs (capital, labor and materials). Finally, we implement the Olley Pakes 
(1996) estimator.
28 This allows the unobserved firm-specific efficiency effect to follow a first-order 
Markov process. Again, using these estimates of the production function parameters we construct 
firm specific efficiency/TFP measures that we then relate in a second stage to management practices 
and other time invariant firm characteristics. 
 
 
IV.B Econometric Results 
 
Table 2 investigates the association between firm performance and management practices. Column 
(1) simply reports a levels OLS specification including only labor, country and time dummies as 
additional controls. The management score is strongly positively and significantly associated with 
higher labor productivity. The second column includes capital and materials, and this almost halves 
the management coefficient
29. In column (3), we include our general controls of industry dummies, 
average hours worked, education, firm age, and listing status. This reduces the management 
coefficient slightly more, but it remains significant. Finally, in column (4) we include a set of 
interview “noise controls” to mitigate biases across interviewers and types of interviewees.
30 This 
actually increases the management coefficient, as we would expect if we were stripping out some of 
the measurement error in the management score. Overall, the first four columns suggest that the 
average management score is positively and significantly correlated with total factor productivity.  
 
In Appendix D, we present more econometrically sophisticated production function estimates based 
on the “two step” method discussed above where we recover the long-run component of TFP and 
                                                 
28 See Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) on System GMM estimation, and Olley and Pakes 
(1996) on their estimation strategy. 
29 If one of the mechanisms through which better management improves productivity is by increasing investment in 
capital, we may be being too conservative by conditioning on capital. 
30 In Table C1 in the Appendix, we detail these noise controls with column (1) reporting the results from regressing 
management on the full set of noise controls and column (2) the results from regressing management on our selected set 
of (informative) noise controls that we use in our main regressions.    16
project this on the management score and other covariates.
31 We estimate the permanent component 
either by within groups, System GMM or Olley-Pakes. The results are as strong, if not stronger, than 
those presented here for the simple OLS regressions. Whether estimated by GMM, Olley-Pakes or 
within groups, management practices are always positively and significantly associated with the 
longer run component of TFP. 
 
We were concerned that the definition of “good management” may be biased towards an Anglo-
Saxon view of the management world. Some may regard such business practices as suitable for the 
‘free markets’ of Britain and America, but less suitable for Continental Europe. We empirically 
tested this by including interactions of the management term with country dummies – we could not 
reject that the hypothesis that the coefficients on management were equal across countries
32. 
 
In addition to the overall management score, we looked at the role that individual questions play. 
Re-running column (4) of Table 2 we find that twelve of the question z-scores are individually 
significant at the five per cent level, two are individually significant at the 10% level and four appear 
insignificant
33. The average question-level point estimate is 0.018 – less than half the pooled average 
of 0.042 - reflecting the higher question level measurement error (see Appendix C). We also 
calculated the average score separately for the four groups of management practices and entered 
them one at a time into the production function. The point estimates (standard errors) were as 




We also considered whether the management measure was simply proxying for better technology in 
the firm. Although technology measures such as Research and Development (R&D) and computer 
use are only available for sub-samples of the dataset, we did not find that the management 
coefficient fell by very much in the production function when we include explicit measures of 
technology, as these are not strongly correlated with good management
35.  
 
The final four columns of Table 2 examine four other measures of firm performance. In column (5) 
we use an alternative performance measure which is return on capital employed (ROCE), a 
                                                 
31 The exact number of observations depends on estimation technique. For Olley-Pakes, we need at least one period for 
lags and must drop all observations with non-positive values of investment. For System GMM we lose two lags to 
construct instruments and include dynamics. We condition on firms having at least four continuous years of data. 
32 For example, we generated a dummy for the two Continental European countries and interacting this with the 
management score. When entered as an additional variable in the column (4) specification the coefficient was 0.024 with 
a standard error of 0.028. In Table D the final two columns split the sample into different regions (Continental Europe 
and Anglo-American). We find that the coefficients on management are, if anything, larger in France and Germany than 
in the UK or US (although this difference is not statistically significant). 
33 This suggests that not all eighteen of the individual management practices are associated with better performance. We 
could of course construct a “refined” management measure by averaging over the individually significant questions, but 
this becomes too close to crude data mining. 
34 Details of the regressions appear in Appendix Table A2. We also examined specifications with multiple questions or 
different groupings, but statistically the simple average was the best representation of the data. Part of the problem is that 
it is hard to reliably identify clusters of practices in the presence of measurement error. We show how sub-sets of 
management practices vary systematically in sub-section IV.C below. 
35 In the context of the specification in Table 2 column (4) for the 219 firms where we observe PCs per employee the 
management coefficient is 0.069 with standard error of 0.041 (the coefficient on PCs was 0.051 with a standard error of 
0.024). This compares to a management coefficient of 0.073 with a standard error of 0.042 on the same sample when 
PCs are not included. For the sample of 216 firms where we have R&D information the coefficient on management is 
0.046 with a standard error of 0.017 in the specification with R&D and 0.050 with a standard error of 0.017 in the 
specification without R&D.   17
profitability measure used by financial analysts and managers to benchmark firm performance (see 
Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). The significant and positive coefficient in the ROCE equation, which 
also includes the same set of controls as in column (4), confirms the basic productivity results. In 
column (6), we estimate a Tobin’s Q specification (the ratio of the market value of the firm to its 
book value), which again includes the same set of controls as in the production function. We also 
find a significant and positive coefficient on management. In column (7), we estimate the 
relationship between exit in the twelve months after the survey and management practices. Over this 
period, eight firms went bankrupt, for whom the implied marginal effects of management in the 
probit equation are large and statistically significant. In column (8), we estimate the relationship 
between the average annual growth rate of sales and management practices and find a positive and 
significant coefficient on management.  
 
Overall then, there is substantial external validation that the measures of management we use are 
positively and significantly associated with better firm performance. Interestingly, the association is 
not simply with productivity but also with profitability (and market value, survival and growth). This 
would be naturally predicted by the managerial inefficiency model, but is not predicted from the 
pure “optimal choice of management model”. We must be cautious in interpreting this as strong 
positive support for the former model, however, as Table 2 simply presents associations and there 
are endogeneity issues (see sub-section V.E below). Nevertheless, at the very least these results offer 




IV.C Contingent management 
 
In this sub-section we examine some of the empirical predictions of the “optimal choice” model of 
management and produce some supportive evidence. In this model, the importance of different 
practices for firm performance will be contingent on a firm’s environment. For example, firms in a 
high-skill industry may find good human-capital management practices relatively more important 
than those in a low-skill industry
36.  
 
First, we investigated the impact of the weighting across individual questions through factor 
analysis. There appeared to be one dominant factor that loaded heavily on all our questions – which 
could be labeled “good management” – which accounted for 49% of the variation
37. The only other 
notable factor, which accounted for a further 7% of the variation, could be labeled as “human capital 
relative to fixed capital”, which had a positive loading on most of the human capital oriented 
questions and a negative loading on the fixed capital/operations type questions. This factor was 
uncorrelated with any productivity measures, although interestingly it was significantly positively 
correlated with our skills measures (e.g. the proportion of employees with college degrees) and the 
level of organizational devolvement
38, suggesting a slightly different pattern of relative management 
practices across firms with different levels of human capital. 
 
                                                 
36 See also Athey and Stern (1998) 
37 Re-estimating the production functions of Table 2 column (4), we found that this “good management” factor score had 
a coefficient of 0.029 with a standard error of 0.009. 
38 In the survey we also collected two questions on organizational structure (see Appendix Table A3) taken from 
Bresnahan et al. (2002).   18
We examine this issue more explicitly in Table 3 where we find robust evidence that firms and 
industries with higher skills – as proxied by college degrees or average wages – have significantly 
better relative human-capital management practices. Column (1) regresses the average score of the 
three explicitly human-capital (“HC”) focused questions (13, 17 and 18) on the percentage of 
employees with a degree (in logs), and finds a large positive coefficient of 0.220. By comparison, 
column (2) runs the same regression but uses the average score of the three most fixed capital 
(“FC”) focused questions (1, 2 and 4) as the dependent variable. In this column we also find a 
significantly positive association but with a much smaller coefficient of 0.100. Column (3) uses the 
difference between the human capital focused and fixed capital focused management practices as the 
dependent variable and shows that this measure of “relative intensity of human-capital management 
practices” (“HC-FC”) is significantly higher in highly skilled firms. Column (4) includes the general 
controls that weaken the correlation but it remains significant at the 10 per cent level. Hence, while 
higher skilled firms have better overall management practices, they are particularly good at the most 
human-capital focused management practices. Columns (5) to (8) run similar regressions on firm 
average wages (rather than college degrees) as a measure of skills. We find a similar pattern of more 
human-capital focused management practices in higher waged firms. Finally, column (9) uses a 
three-digit industry level measure of skills instead of a firm-specific measure, the proportion of 
employees with a college degree in the US. We also find that this is positively correlated with the 
relative intensity of human-capital management practices. Overall, this table is consistent with the 




IV.D Firm performance-related measurement bias  
 
A criticism of our “external validity” test of looking at production functions is that for psychological 
reasons managers will respond “optimistically” in firms who are doing well even if the true state of 
management practices is poor
39. We call this firm performance-related measurement bias. Note that 
this is different from the reverse causality issue that states that management practices genuinely 
improve in response to a shock that raises productivity (see section V.E below for a discussion of 
this issues and an instrumentation strategy that attempts to deal with it). 
 
There are several considerations mitigating the problem of firm performance-related measurement 
bias in our study. First, the survey is deliberately designed to try to avoid this kind of bias by using a 
“double-blind” methodology based on open questions, with the managers unaware they are being 
scored. So to the extent that managers talk about actual practices in their firms this should help to 
reduce this measurement bias.  
 
Second, as we shall show below in section V.B, firms in more competitive industries – defined in 
terms of lower historical average rents – are on average better managed. Therefore, at the industry 
level the correlation between management practices and historic average profitability goes in the 
reverse direction to that implied by this measurement bias story.  
 
Third, psychological evidence (e.g., Schwarz and Strack, 1999) suggests that recent improvements 
in a subject’s condition are more likely to have an impact on survey responses than the absolute 
                                                 
39 We thank Bengt Holmstrom for emphasizing this issue.   19
level of a condition. Therefore, if there were a large performance-related bias in the management 
scores we would expect this to show up in the fact that recent improvements in firm productivity 
(relative to comparators) have a big impact on managerial responses. In fact, when we regress 
management scores against lagged productivity growth rates there is no significant correlation. For 
example, a regression of management scores against the productivity growth rates over the previous 
year generated a coefficient (standard error) of 0.001 (0.002).
40 
 
Finally, the Appendices report a further battery of robustness tests on this issue. Not all individual 
questions are significantly correlated with performance, as shown in Appendix Table A2. Therefore, 
to the extent this bias is a serious phenomenon it only seems to afflict certain questions. One reason 
of course may be that some questions are more or less subject to bias because they are more or less 
“objective”. To investigate this further Appendix Table D2 runs some robustness tests on the 
management performance results by using a management measure based on the four questions 
which are arguable the most objective (column 1), and the four questions which are arguably the 
least objective (column 2).
41 Comparing these two columns demonstrates that the coefficients on 
these two sub-sets of questions, however, are not significantly different. In columns (3) to (8) in 
Appendix Table D2 we report the results from running the production function estimation on three 
other survey measures – a self-scored “work-life balance” indicator and two self-scored 
“organizational devolvement” indicators - which should also be afflicted by the measurement bias 
story. However, as can be seen from columns (3) to (8) these measures are not significantly 
correlated with productivity, suggesting that the questions are not all reflections of a “warm glow” 
surrounding a firm who is performing well. 
 
Hence, in conclusion while there is undoubtedly scope for firm performance related measurement 
bias in the survey; we do not find evidence that this is a major problem in our results. 
 
V. ACCOUNTING FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES 
 
V.A The distribution of management practices 
 
Having confirmed that our management measures are significantly related to firm performance, we 
now proceed to examine the management scores directly. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the 
average management scores per firm across all eighteen questions, plotted by country in raw form 
(not in z-score form). It is clear that there is a huge amount of heterogeneity within each country 
with firms spread across most of the distribution. About 2% of the overall variation in firms’ average 
management scores is across countries, 42% is across countries by three-digit industry, and the 
remaining 56% is within country and industry. This spread is particularly wide when considered 
against the fact that a score of one indicates industry worst practice and five industry best practices. 
Therefore, for example, firms scoring two or less have only basic shop-floor management, very 
                                                 
40 We also tested this management and productivity growth relationship over longer periods in a Table 2 Column (4) 
specification – such as the last 5 years and the last 3 years – and found equally insignificant results. The positive 
correlation of management with productivity levels and sales growth but not with productivity growth is consistent with 
a simple dynamic selection model. Management (and therefore productivity levels) is fixed over time and the market 
gradually allocates more sales to the more productive firms. 
41 Appendix Table A2 reports the individual coefficients for every question so any other grouping of the questions by an 
alternative categorization of “objectivity” can also be analyzed.   20
limited monitoring of processes or people, ineffective and inappropriate targets, and poor incentives 
and firing mechanisms. Thus, one of the central questions we address in the next sub-section is how 
do these firms survive?  
 
Looking across countries the US has on average the highest scores (3.37), Germany is second (3.32), 
France third (3.13) and the UK last (3.08), with the gaps between the US, Continental Europe 
(France and Germany) and the UK are statistically significant at the 5% level. The UK-US gap also 
appears persistent over time. The Marshall Plan productivity mission of 1947 reported that “efficient 
management was the most significant factor in the American advantage [over the UK]” (Dunning, 
1958, p. 120). We were concerned that some of the apparent cross-country differences in 
management scores may simply be driven by differences in the sampling size distribution, but these 
figures are robust to controls for size and public ownership.
42 
 
The presence of the US at the top of the ranking is consistent with anecdotal evidence from other 
surveys.
43 It also reflects the productivity rankings from other studies comparing the four nations 
(the US is top and the UK bottom). One might suspect this was due to an “Anglo-Saxon” bias that is 
why in the previous section we had to confront the scores with data on productivity to show that the 
management scores are correlated with real outcomes within countries (see Table 2). Furthermore, 
the position of the UK as the country with the lowest average management scores indicates that the 
survey instrument is not intrinsically Anglo-Saxon biased. Table A2 in Appendix A provides more 
details behind these cross-country comparisons, and reveals a relative US strength in targets and 
incentives (more people management) versus a German and French strength in shop floor and 




V.B Management practices and product market competition 
 
A common argument is that variations in management practice result from the differences in product 
market competition; either because of selection effects and/or because of variations in the incentives 
to supply effort (see our model in Appendix E). Table 4 attempts to investigate this by examining the 
relationship between product market competition and management. We use three broad measures of 
competition following Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al. (2005). The first measure is the degree of 
import penetration in the country by three-digit industry measured as the share of total imports over 
domestic production. This is constructed for the period 1995-1999 to remove any potential 
contemporaneous feedback
45. The second is the country by three digit industry Lerner index of 
competition, which is (1 – profits/sales), calculated as the average across the entire firm level 
database (excluding each firm itself)
46. Again, this is constructed for the period 1995-1999 to 
                                                 
42  We also find that the 21 US multinational subsidiaries located in Europe in our dataset are significantly better 
managed (average 3.74) than either the 405 domestic European firms (average 3.11) or the 16 non-US multinational 
subsidiaries (average 3.12). So American firms also manage to transport their management practices to their overseas 
subsidiaries.
 
43 For example, Proudfoot (2003) regularly reports that US firms were least hindered by poor management practices 
(36%) compared to Australia, France, Germany, Spain, South Africa and the UK. Unfortunately, these samples are 
drawn only from the consulting groups’ clients so suffer from serious selection bias.  
44 We also found in France and German firms were significantly more hierarchical (gave managers more power relative 
to workers) in pace and task allocation compared to the UK and particularly the US. 
45 Melitz (2003) and other have suggested this measure of trade exposure should truncate the lower part of the 
productivity distribution. We have also looked at (Imports+Exports)/production as an alternative indicator of trade 
exposure with similar results to those reported here. 
46 Note that in constructing this we draw on firms in the population database, not just those in the survey.   21
remove any potential contemporaneous feedback. The third measure of competition is the survey 
question on the number of competitors a firm faces (see Appendix A3), valued zero for “non 




In column (1), we see that better management scores are positively and significantly associated with 
greater import penetration. In column (2), we re-estimate the same specification but now include a 
full set of controls, and again find that higher lagged trade competition is significantly correlated 
with better management. The firm controls include firm size, firm age, listing status, skills and 
consolidation status.
48 Even after conditioning on these additional covariates, we find that the more 
competitive country-industry pairings contain firms that are on average significantly better managed. 
In columns (3) and (4), we run two similar specifications on lagged Lerner index of competition as 
an alternative competition measure and again find a significant and positive effect. In columns (5) 
and (6), we run two further similar specifications, but this time using managers’ own self reported 
measure of the number of competitors they face, and again we find a positive and significant 
association: the more rivals a firm perceives it faces the better managed it appears to be. The final 
two columns include all three competition measures simultaneously. Although the statistical 
significance and marginal effects are typically a bit lower, the same pattern of results persists. 
Tougher product market competition is associated with significantly better management practices
49. 
 
The magnitude of the competition effect on average management scores is of economic as well as 
statistical significance. For example in column (6) increasing the number of competitors from “few” 
to “many” is associated with a management z-score increase of 0.145 or a raw management score 
increase of about 0.160.
50 As discussed in the section VI this competition effect accounts for a 
substantial proportion of the tail of badly performing firms and the management gap between the US 
and Europe. 
 
These are conditional correlations, of course, as we have no instrumental variable for competition. 
However, it is likely that any endogeneity bias will cause us to underestimate the importance of 
product market competition on management. For example, in columns (3) and (4) an exogenous 
positive shock that raises managerial quality in an industry is likely to increase profitability and 
therefore the measured Lerner index (indeed, Table 2 showed a positive correlation between 
management and individual firm level profitability). This will make it harder for us to identify any 
positive impact of product market competition on management
51. 
 
                                                 
47 This question has been used by inter alia Nickell (1996) and Stewart (1990).  
48 We also experimented with many other controls (results available on request). Union density was negatively correlated 
with management scores, but insignificant. Although there was a significant negative correlation between management 
scores and average worker age in simple specifications, this disappeared when we controlled for firm age (older workers 
are more likely to be matched with older firms). The proportion of females was insignificant. 
49 We also looked for a relationship between the level of competition and the spread of management practices (Syverson, 
2004a, b), but could not find any significant relationship. One reason may be our current sample is too small to test for 
differences in the second moment of management across sub-samples. 
50 The difference in the raw management score between the 75
th and 25
th percentiles of the distribution is 1.06. The ratio 
of the standard deviations of the firm-level management scores to the z-scores is 1.098. 
51 Similarly, better management will improve exports, reduce the degree of imports, and probably mean that the firm 
pulls away from other competitors and feels less threatened. These will all generate a bias towards zero on the 
competition indicators in Table 4.   22
One issue in interpreting this competition effect is that it potentially works through two mechanisms 
(see Section II): (i) increasing management scores through greater managerial effort; and (ii) greater 
competition increasing the relative exit rate of badly managed firms versus well-managed firms. 
Using the managerial hours worked as a basic proxy for effort, we find an insignificant relationship 
between tougher competition and longer hours
52 Of course managerial hours is a very imperfect 
proxy for managerial effort, as managers may supply more effort by a greater “intensity” of work 
rather than longer hours. Still, it does suggest that the margin of impact of competition is not on the 
length of the working day or week. 
 
 
V.C Management practices and family firms 
 
In Table 5, we investigate the impact of hereditary family ownership on firms’ management scores 
(see Table 1 for descriptive statistics on types of ownership and control by the family). Column (1) 
starts by regressing management scores against an indicator of the family as the single largest owner 
(defined on total family holdings
53) plus the standard set of control variables. We see that family 
ownership per se does not seem to be associated with depressed firm performance, with a negative 
but insignificant coefficient. In column (2) we regress management practices against an indicator of 
family ownership and family management (defined by the CEO being a family member), and find 
the coefficient becomes more negative but again is not significantly different from zero. In column 
(3), we include an indicator that the firm is family owned, family managed with the CEO succession 
determined by primo geniture - that is they explicitly stated that the policy of the firm has been to 
pass this position to the eldest son. For these firms we see a strongly negative and significant 
coefficient, suggesting the sub-set of family firms who adopted primo geniture successions are 
substantially worse managed. In column (4) we drop the general controls and show that the family 
firm correlation is much stronger in the unconditional regressions. In column (5) we include all three 
indicators and see that it is the primo geniture family firms that are driving the negative coefficients 
on family ownership and management. In fact, family ownership per se has a positive and weakly 
significant association with good management. The final column drops the founder firms from the 
sample so that external ownership is the pure baseline, which makes little difference to the results. 
Taking Table 5 as a whole it seems that the combination of family ownership and primo geniture 
family management significantly damages company performance. 
 
 One interpretation of this result is that being a primo geniture company directly causes inferior 
performance in family firms due to the types of selection and “Carnegie effects” discussed in section 
II. Another interpretation is that primo geniture is an indicator of firms being more generally 
backward, suggesting the persistence of “old-fashioned” management techniques. While this is 
possible we do nevertheless find that primo geniture family firms are significantly worse managed 
even after including controls for firm age, average employee age and CEO age.
54 It is also difficult 
                                                 
52 For example, the coefficient (standard deviation) of managerial hours on import penetration, the Lerner index and the 
number of competitors is 1.033 (0.881), -2.498 (6.657) and 0.847 (0.612) respectively based on an identical specification 
to Table 4 column (2), except with managerial hours as the dependent variable instead of the management score. 
53 We also looked at the breakdown of individual family holdings (e.g. if two brothers owned half the equity each), but 
could not find any significant impact of the relative or absolute differences in holdings of the first and second largest 
family shareholders. One reason may be that complete data on this was hard to obtain for European firms.  
54 Another interpretation on the poor management of family firms is that they operate less formally due to a lower return 
from “bureaucracy” (Novaes and Zingales, 2004). The point-estimate (standard errors) for the column (3) specification   23
to see why France and the UK should exogenously have a greater number of old-fashioned firms 
than Germany or the US (given our controls for industrial structure, age and size). By contrast, the 
common Norman legal origin of the France and the UK offers a direct historical reason for the 
persistence of primo geniture.  
 
 
V.D Management Scores and Management Ability 
 
Another interpretation for the variation in managerial practices across firms is that our management 
score proxies for the underlying ability of managers (and employees) in the firm, with well-managed 
firms simply those containing a large-fraction of high ability managers. Under this view, our proxies 
of human capital (such as the proportion of employees with college degrees and the proportion with 
MBAs) do not control for this unobserved ability. Even under this interpretation it is, of course, 
interesting that lower product market competition and primo geniture increases the incidence of poor 
quality managers. 
 
However, several findings cause us to doubt that the management scores we measure are simply a 
cipher for employee ability. First, assuming employees are paid their marginal product, we would 
not expect to observe the positive correlation between good management practices and profits and 
market value discussed earlier (see Table 2) as this would be “priced out” in the market. Second, we 
also find that controlling for the average wages has very little effect on the size of the management 
coefficient in the production functions, suggesting that the management score is not simply a proxy 
for unobserved employee ability
55. Finally, CEO pay (a proxy for top-managerial ability) is not 
correlated with our management score once we control for firm size
56. Therefore, while managerial 
ability may account for some of the variation in management practices across firms; this is unlikely 
to explain all the observed variation. Our interpretation is that managerial practices are deeply 
embedded in the organizational capital of the firm, and this explains the higher productivity and 
profitability of well-managed firms. This organizational capital is greater than the sum of the parts of 
abilities and skills of the current employees. 
 
 
V.E Instrumental variable estimates of management practices in the production function 
 
Returning to the production functions estimates in the previous section, we noted that it was not 
possible to regard the coefficient on management as a causal effect of management on firm 
performance. Our estimated effects of the “true effect” of management on productivity could be 
biased upwards or downwards due to reverse causality. For example, positive feedback could occur 
if higher productivity enabled cash-constrained to invest more resources in improving managerial 
                                                                                                                                                                   
for individual management components are: Shop floor operations -0.341 (0.147); Monitoring -0.345 (0.116); Targets -
0.229 (0.115); and Incentives -0.231 (0.099). So while there is some evidence for this in the particularly low monitoring 
scores for family firms, they still score significantly badly on other management components like shop floor operations 
and incentives, which are not obviously linked to more formalized management styles. 
55 When we include the ln(average wage of the firm) and its interactions with country dummies in a specification 
identical to that of column (4) in Table 2, the management coefficient is 0.051 with a standard error of 0.017. This 
compares to a management coefficient of 0.059 with a standard error of 0.017 without the wage terms on the same 
sample (we only have 2,612 observations for this regression compared to the 5,350 in Table 2 because wage data is not 
reported for some of the firms in the sample). The wage terms are positive and significant. 
56 For example, regressing log(CEO pay) on firm size, public/private status, country dummies, industry dummies, and 
the management score, we find the coefficient (standard error) on the management score is 0.001 (0.051). Note that 
although CEO pay includes bonuses it does not include share options.   24
practices. This would bias our coefficient on management upwards. Negative feedback could occur 
if higher productivity allows managers to reduce their input of effort.
57 This would bias the 
coefficient on management downwards.  
 
 We present results in Table 6 using product market competition and/or family ownership as 
instrumental variables for management practices. For this to be valid we need to not only assume 
that our measures of product market competition and ownership are exogenous (as in Table 6) but 
also that the mechanism by which competition (and ownership) impacts on productivity is solely 
through improving managerial practices. Essentially, we are assuming the model in Appendix E is 
correct, and based on these admittedly strong identification assumptions the instrumental variable 
strategy identifies the causal effect of management on performance.  
 
Table 6 contains the results of using competition and/or family management to instrument 
management practices in the production function. The baseline is column (1) which repeats the 
simple OLS productivity equations including management on the right hand side
58. Columns (2), (3) 
and (4) then present production function results confirming that competition and family primo 
geniture are important determinants of firm level productivity, matching their role in determining 
management practices. Column (5) then estimates a production function in which management is 
instrumented using the import penetration and family primo geniture management, generating a 
management coefficient which significantly positive and over five-fold larger in magnitude than the 
OLS coefficient. As noted in Section IV, this is likely to be due to heavy measurement error in our 
definition of “good” management and/or negative feedback from firm performance to managerial 
effort. As can be seen from the bottom of column (5) these instruments are not rejected by the 
Hansen-Sargan test of instrument validity. Columns (6) and (7) then present robustness results 
instrumenting management using just competition and then just family management individually. 
These also suggest downward bias from the OLS estimates 
 
The coefficients in the production function estimates are of quantitative as well as statistical 
significance. Although we cannot clearly attribute causality to the management scores on 
productivity, a movement from the lower to the upper quartile of management scores between firms 
(0.971 points) is associated with an increase in TFP of between 3.2% and 7.5% under OLS and 
21.6% under IV. Empirically the difference in TFP between the lower quartile and upper quartile of 
our firms is 31.9%. In a purely accounting sense, therefore, management scores explain between 
10% and 23% of the inter-quartile range of productivity under OLS and about 66% under IV
59. 
                                                 
57 Higher scoring practices involve more time and effort from managers on a range of the monitoring and target 
practices, plus potentially more difficult decisions in incentive practices over hiring, firing, pay and promotions. 
58 This is identical to column (1) in Table D1. 
59 We take the OLS coefficients in Table 2 to be between 0.032 and 0.075; we use the IV coefficient of Table 6 column  
(5). The TFP calculations are the within-group residuals from Table D1 column (s). An equivalent calculation for the 90-
10 implies that management accounts for up to 22% under OLS and 64% under I.V.   25
 
VI. EXPLAINING MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ACROSS FIRMS 
AND COUNTRIES: QUANTIFICATION 
 
We turn to quantifying the role of product market competition and primo geniture family firms in 
accounting for management practices. 
 
VI.A Explaining the Tail of Badly Managed Firms 
 
One of the interesting features of the raw data is the substantial fraction of firms that appear to have 
surprisingly bad management practices, with scores of two or less. These firms have only basic 
shop-floor management, very limited monitoring of processes or people, ineffective and 
inappropriate targets, and poor incentives and firing mechanisms. In addition, our calibration of the 
measurement error suggests these firms cannot be entirely explained by sampling noise. 
Interestingly most of the differences across countries highlighted in Figure 1 are due to the left tail
60 
- the low UK and French average management scores are primarily due to their long tail of badly 
managed firms. 
 
To investigate the extent to which low competition and primo geniture family firms can account for 
this tail of badly run firms we split the sample based on these measures. Figure 3 plots the 
management histogram for all firms reporting low competition
61 and/or primo geniture family 
succession, accounting for 415 firms. Figure 4 plots the management histogram for the remaining 
high-competition and no primo geniture succession, accounting for the remaining 307 firms. 
Comparing these two graphs, it is clear that the tail of badly managed firms is substantially larger in 
the low competition and primo geniture sample, with 8.9 per cent of firms scoring two or less, 
compared to 2.7 per cent of firms in the high competition no primo-geniture sample.
62 Given that 6.5 
per cent of all firms in the sample scored 2 or less, controlling for competition and primo geniture 




                                                 
60 We ran a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality of management score distributions between the US and Germany 
versus the UK and France and found this is rejected (p-value=0.002) on the whole sample. If we test equality of this 
distribution for management scores above 2 this is not rejected (p-value=0.391). After truncating at 2 the coefficients on 
the country dummies (standard errors) in a Table 7 Column (1) specification with a US-baseline fall to -0.015 (0.060) for 
Germany, -0.012 (0.078) for France and -0.128 (0.070) for the UK, so that the US-French gap is eliminated and the US-
UK gap falls by more than half. 
61 Defined by firms reporting “few” or “no” competitors. We use this measure to analyze cross-country competition 
because it is consistently measured across the sample. The Lerner index and import penetration measures may vary with 
accounting standards and country size respectively. In the regression results, we controlled for this with country 
dummies and identify from within country variations, but in this section we want to look across countries. 
62 This split is also true in the US and European sub samples. In the US 5.2% of firms, score 2 or less in the low 
competition and/or primo geniture group while 0.6% score two or less in the high competition non primo geniture group. 
In Europe 11.2% of firms score 2 or less in the low competition and/or primo geniture group while 5.3% score 2 or less 
in the high competition non primo geniture group.  
63 Competition explains around two-thirds of this reduction in the tail, with conditioning on “many” competitors alone 
taking the share of firms scoring two or less from 6.9% (in the whole sample) down to 4.2%.    26
 
VI.B Explaining the Cross-Country Variation in Management Scores 
 
In Table 7, we attempt to account for the variations in management practices across countries. In 
column (1), we regress management on dummy variables for Germany, France and the UK (with the 
US as the omitted as baseline category). We find that French and UK firms are significantly worse 
managed than US firms on average, with a gap of 0.202 and 0.276 respectively, while German firms 
are worse managed but not significantly so with a smaller gap of 0.045. In column (2), we include a 
dummy for a primo geniture family firm whose coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% 
level as expected. The coefficient on the UK and French dummy variables drop substantially by 
around 0.09, reflecting the extensive presence of family firms with traditional primo geniture 
progression rules.
64 In column (3), we condition on our measure of the number of competitors faced 
by the firm. Consistent with the earlier results of the competition variables this enters the regression 
with a positive and significant coefficient. The coefficient on the UK dummy drops slightly as the 
degree of competition is only marginally lower in the UK than in the US. By contrast the 
coefficients for France and Germany drop by about 0.04, because the level of competition is 
reported to be lower by French or German companies than by US firms.
65 Together competition and 
family firm status accounts for around two-thirds (62% = 100*(.202-.077)/.202) of the gap between 
the US and France and one-third (32% = 100*(.276-.188))/.276) of the gap between the US and the 
UK. In column (4), we add one final control, which is the proportion of employees with a college 
degree, and find that this accounts for much of the remaining UK and French gap with the US. 
 
 Although we were expecting the competition results, the role of family firms is more surprising. The 
finding matches up with an earlier economic history literature of Landes (1967) and Chandler 
(1994), who claim that hereditary family management was probably the primary the reason for the 
industrial decline of the UK and France relative to the US and Germany around the early 1900s.
66 
For example, Landes (1967) states that: 
 
“The Britain of the late 19th Century basked complacently in the sunset of economic 
hegemony. Now it was the turn of the third generation…[and] the weakness of British 
enterprise reflected their combination of amateurism and complacency” 
  [p. 563] 
 
“Before the war the model [French] enterprise was family-owned and operated, security-
orientated rather than risk-taking, technologically conservative and economically 
inefficient”  
  [p. 528] 
 
The results in Table 6 suggest family firms – at least in our sample of medium sized manufacturing 
firms - are still a factor in explaining cross-country management practices one hundred years later. 
                                                 
64 Controlling for firm size and public/private mix does not notably change these results with the respective coefficients 
for Germany, France and the UK in column (1) -0.081, -0.183 and -0.276; in column (2) -0.051, -0.075 and -0.200; in 
column (3) -0.042, -0.127 and -0.251; and in column (4) 0.010, -0.028 and -0.126.  
65 In the descriptive statistics of Table B1, the index of competition is 2.56 for the US, 2.52 for the UK, 2.35 for 
Germany and 2.32 for France. 
66 Nicholas (1999) provides supporting evidence for the UK, showing that over this period individuals who inherited 
family firms accumulated less lifetime wealth than either firm founders or professional managers.    27
And extrapolating from the 20 per cent of firms under family ownership in 2004 to the majority 
share they would have accounted for in the early Twentieth Century suggests they could have played 




In this paper we use an innovative survey tool to collect management practice data from 732 
medium sized manufacturing firms in Europe and the US. The methodology described here 
combines traditional survey tools used by economists with the more in-depth case study interview 
techniques recommended by management specialists. We believe that it will be a useful part of the 
empirical toolkit to be used by economists interested in the internal organization of firms. Rather 
than simply label unobserved heterogeneity “fixed effects” we have explicitly developed indicators 
of managerial best practice. 
 
In our application we find these measures of better management practice are strongly associated with 
superior firm performance in terms of productivity, profitability, Tobin’s Q, sales growth and 
survival. We also find significant country variation with American firms on average much better 
managed than European firms. There is, however a much larger variation between firms within 
countries with a long tail of extremely badly managed firms. This heterogeneity is consistent with 
what we know from the productivity distribution between firms and plants. Why do so many firms 
exist with apparently inferior management practices, and why does this vary so much across 
countries? We find this is due to a combination of: (i) low product market competition that appears 
to allow poor management practices to persist, and (ii) family firms passing management control 
down by primo geniture. European firms in our sample report facing lower levels of competition 
than American firms. France and the UK also display substantially higher levels of primo geniture 
probably due to their Norman legal origin and traditions and the more generous exemption from the 
estate taxation regime. Product market competition and family firms alone appear to account for 
around half of the long tail of badly managed firms and between two thirds (France) and one-third 
(UK) of the European management gap with the US.  
 
A possible criticism of our research design is that we have focused on managerial practices from the 
employer perspective rather than the worker perspective. Do these “tough” management practices 
come at the expense of work intensification and a breakdown of reciprocity and job satisfaction in 
the workplace? Although we did not interview workers directly regarding managerial practices, we 
doubt that we would get a radically different picture from such information. In a companion paper 
(Bloom, Kretschmer and Van Reenen, 2006) we show that our overall management score is strongly 
positively correlated with many pro-worker features of firms such as more generous childcare 
subsidies and better work-life balance indicators. Although these indicators have no association with 
productivity conditional on management, it suggests that workers may actually prefer working in 
well-run firms to badly run firms. 
 
A range of potential extensions to this work is planned, including running a second survey wave in 
2006. It is important to follow up these firms in order to examine the extent to which management 
practice evolves over time. This will enable us to examine whether competition is working simply 
through selection or if there is learning of better managerial techniques by incumbent firms. The 
methodology of quantifying management is general enough to be applied (with modifications) to 
other countries and other sectors, including the public sector. We are also developing this survey   28
methodology to measure the organizational structure and characteristics of firms, attempting to 
empirically test the long line of organizational theories of the firm.   29
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1st interview score
Figure 1: Distribution of management scores by country  


























Note: These are the distributions of the raw management scores (simple averages across all 18 questions for each firm). 
1 indicates worst practice, 5 indicates best practice.  There are 135 French observations, 156 German observations, 151 
UK observations and 290 US observations. 
 





















Note:  Scores from 64 repeat interviews on the same firm with different managers and different interviewers. Simple 
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Notes:  Average management scores for the 415 firms which: (i) report facing “few” or “no” competitors, and/or (ii) 
have a family (2
nd generation or more) as the largest shareholder with a family CEO chosen by primo geniture. Split by 
country is France (95), Germany (101), UK (85) and the US (134). Overall 8.9% of the sample score two or less. 1 
indicates worst practice, 5 indicates best practice   
 


























Notes:  Average management scores for the 307 firms which report facing “many” competitors, and do not have a family 
(2
nd generation or more) as the largest shareholder with a family CEO chosen by primo geniture. Split by country is 
France (34), Germany (51), UK (66) and the US (156). Overall 2.7% of the sample score two or less. 1 indicates worst 
practice, 5 indicates best practice     35
TABLE 1: HEREDITARY FAMILY FIRM INVOLVEMENT BY COUNTRY 
 
% France  Germany  UK  US 
Family largest shareholder  32 30  30  10 
Family largest shareholder and family CEO  22 12  23  7 
Family largest shareholder, family CEO and primo geniture  14 3  15  3 
Founder largest shareholder  18 5  14  18 
Founder largest shareholder and CEO  10 2  12  11 
Number of firms  137 156  152  290 
 
NOTES: These mean values are taken from our sample of 732 firms. Family shareholding is combined across all family members. 
Family involvement is defined as second-generation family or beyond. Primo geniture defined by a positive answer to the question 
“How was the management of the firm passed down: was it to the eldest son or by some other way?” (see Table A3).   
Alternatives to primo-geniture in frequency order are younger sons, son in-laws, daughters, brothers, wives and nephews. “Family 
largest shareholder” firms defined as those with a single family (combined across all family members, whom are all second generation 
or beyond) as the largest shareholder; “Family largest shareholder and family CEO” firms are those with additionally a family 
member as the CEO; “Family largest shareholder, family CEO and primo geniture” who additionally the CEO was selected as the 
eldest male child upon succession. See Appendix B for more details on construction of the variables. 
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATES OF FIRM PERFORMANCE EQUATIONS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Estimation 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  Probit OLS 
Firms  All All All All All Quoted All  All 
Dependent 
variable 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 































































ln (N) it, 















             
General Controls  No  No Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Noise Controls  No No No Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firms  709 709 709 709 690  374  709  702 
Observations  5,350 5,350 5,350 5,350 5,089  2,635  709  4,777 
 
NOTES: All columns estimated by OLS except column (7) which is estimated by probit Maximum Likelihood. In all columns (except 
7), standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates and allow for arbitrary heteroskedacity and correlation (i.e. clustered 
by firm). In column (7), we report the p-value in square brackets below the marginal effects of each variable on the percentage 
increase in the probability of exit (between 2004 and 2005). The coefficients on capital, materials and labor are allowed to be different 
across countries and consolidation status (UK is base). “General controls” comprise of firm-level controls for ln(average hours 
worked), ln(firm age), a dummy for being listed, a dummy for being consolidated, the share of workforce with degrees, the share of 
workforce with MBAs, 108 three digit industry dummies and four country dummies interacted with a full set of time dummies. 
“Noise controls”  are those in the final column of Table C1 (17 interviewer dummies, the seniority, gender, tenure and number of 
countries worked in of the manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of the day the 
interview was conducted), the duration of the interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the 
interviewer). Data runs between 1994 and 2004 except in column (7). 
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TABLE 3: SKILL CONTINGENT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 


































































      
  





No No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Industry 
Controls  No No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No 
               
Firms/industries  732 732  732  732  424  424  424  424  732 
 
NOTES: All columns estimated by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors are clustered by industry in 
column (9)). A single cross section of data used. “HC management” is the average z-score of the three explicitly human capital 
focused questions (questions 13, 17 and 18 in Appendix Table A1). “FC management” is the average z-score of the 3 most fixed 
capital focused questions (1, 2 and 4 in Appendix Table A1). “HC-PC management” is the difference of these two averages. “General 
controls” comprises controls for ln(firm age), ln(average number of employees), a dummy for being listed and country dummies. 
“Industry controls” are a full set of three digit industry dummies. “ln(proportion of employees with college degrees), three digit 
industry level” is the average number of employees with a college level qualification (or higher) in the industry in the 1991 to 1998 
US Current Population Survey (NBER MORG files). We use this measure in all four countries under the assumption that the relative 
skill intensity of industries is similar across countries. Column (9) is weighted by the number of observations on each industry in the 
CPS.  
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TABLE 4: MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION 
 
 
NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustered 
by country * industry pair); single cross-section “General controls” includes a full set of 108 three digit industry dummies,  four 
country dummies, ln(firm size), ln(firm age), a dummy for being listed, the share of workforce with degrees, the share of workforce 
with MBAs, a dummy for being consolidated, and the “noise controls of column (2) in Table C1 (17 interviewer dummies, the 
seniority, gender, tenure and number of countries worked in of the manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was 
conducted, the time of the day the interview was conducted, the duration of the interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the 
information as coded by the interviewer); “Import Penetration” = ln(Import/Production) in every country*industry pair with the 
average over 1995-1999 used. “Lerner index of competition” constructed, as in Aghion et al. (2005), as the mean of (1 - profit/sales) 
in the entire database (excluding the firm itself) for every country industry pair (average over 1995-1999 used). “Number of 
competitors” constructed from the response to the survey question on number of competitors, and is coded as zero for “none” (1% of 
responses), 1 for “less than 5” (51% of responses), and 2 for “5 or more” (48% of responses).  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation 





























































          
Firms  732 732 726 726 732 732 726 726 
General 
controls 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes   39
 
TABLE 5: MANAGEMENT AND FAMILY FIRMS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation Method  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 















































         
Firms  732 732 732 732 732 497 
Country Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
General Controls  Yes Yes Yes No Yes  Yes 
 
NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity); single cross 
section. In columns (1) to (5), the complete sample is used, in column (6) only family firms plus firms with external largest 
shareholders and professional managers are used. “General controls” are 108 three-digit industry dummies, ln(firm size), ln(firm 
age), a dummy for being listed, share of workforce with degrees, share of workforce with MBAs, a dummy for being consolidated, 
and the “noise controls of column (2) in Table C1 (17 interviewer dummies, the seniority, gender, tenure and number of countries 
worked in of the manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of the day the interview was 
conducted, the duration of the interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer).    40
TABLE 6: INSTRUMENTING MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Countries All  All  All All  All  All  All 
Estimation OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV  IV 
Dependent variable 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Management z-score  0.042 
(0.012) 
























































  0.089 
(0.032)    0.088 
(0.032)   
  
Family largest shareholder, 
family CEO and primo geniture     -0.060 
(0.030) 
-0.058 
(0.030)   
  
            
Instrumental variables for 
Management         Imports, 
Family  Imports Family 
General Controls   Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Hansen-Sargan test of over-
identification (p-value)        0.520    







Firms  709 709  709 709  709  709 709 
Observations  5,350 5,  350  5,350 5,350  5,350  5,350  5,350 
 
NOTES: In all columns, standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates and allow for arbitrary heteroskedacity and 
correlation (i.e. clustered by firm). Columns (1) to (3) estimated by OLS levels. Column (4) estimated by IV, with the instrument set 
including all independent variables except management, plus “Import penetration (5-year lagged)” and “Family largest shareholder, 
family CEO and primo geniture”. All columns include a set of “general controls” comprising of ln(hours worked), ln(firm age), a 
dummy for being listed, a dummy for being consolidated, the share of workforce with degrees, the share of workforce with MBAs, 
108 three digit dummies and four country dummies interacted with a full set of time dummies. Controls also includes the “noise 
controls”  of column (2) Table C1 (17 interviewer dummies, the seniority, gender, tenure and number of countries worked in of the 
manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of the day the interview was conducted , the 
duration of the interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer). “Import Penetration” = 
ln(Imports/Production) in every country*industry pair (average over 1995-1999) is used as an explanatory variable in columns (2) and 
(4) and is in the instrument set in columns (5) and (6). “Family largest shareholder, family CEO and primo geniture)” and 
“Family” is a binary indicator for whether the family is the largest shareholder, and the family is CEO chosen by primo geniture. The 
same variable is used as an explanatory variable in columns (3) and (4) and as an instrumental variable in columns (5) and (7). Data 
runs 1994 through 2004.   41
 
TABLE 7: ACCOUNTING FOR MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ACROSS COUNTRIES 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Estimation Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 








Country is the US  Baseline Baseline  Baseline  Baseline 
























Family largest shareholder,   











Ln(Proportion of employees with 
degrees)       0.134 
(0.037) 
        
Firms  732 732  732  732 
 
NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity); single cross 
section. “Family largest shareholder, family CEO and primo geniture)” and “Family” is a binary indicator for whether the family 
is the largest shareholder, and the family is CEO chosen by primo geniture. “Number of competitors” constructed from the response 
to the survey question on number of competitors, and is coded as zero for “none” (1% of responses), 1 for “less than 5” (51% of 
responses), and 2 for “5 or more” (48% of responses). 
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APPENDIX A: DETAILS OF THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
TABLE A1: MANAGEMENT PRACTICE INTERVIEW GUIDE AND EXAMPLE RESPONSES  
 
Any score from 1 to 5 can be given, but the scoring guide and examples are only provided for scores of 1, 3 and 5. Multiple questions are 
used for each dimension to improve scoring accuracy. 
 
(1)  Modern manufacturing, introduction 
   a)  Can you describe the production process for me? 
b)  What kinds of lean (modern) manufacturing processes have you introduced? Can you give me specific examples? 
c)  How do you manage inventory levels? What is done to balance the line?  
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid:  Other than Just-In-Time (JIT) delivery from 
suppliers few modern manufacturing 
techniques have been introduced, (or have 
been introduced in an ad-hoc manner) 
 
Some aspects of modern manufacturing 
techniques have been introduced, through 
informal/isolated change programs 
All major aspects of modern manufacturing have been 
introduced (Just-In-Time, autonomation, flexible 
manpower, support systems, attitudes and behaviour) in 
a formal way 
 Examples:    A UK firm orders in bulk and stores the 
material on average 6 months before use. 
The business focuses on quality and not 
reduction of lead-time or costs. Absolutely 
no modern manufacturing techniques had 
been introduced.  
A supplier to the army is undergoing a full 
lean transformation. For 20 years, the 
company was a specialty supplier to the 
army, but now they have had to identify 
other competencies forcing them to compete 
with lean manufacturers. They have begun 
adopting specific lean techniques and plan to 
use full lean by the end of next year. 
A US firm has formally introduced all major elements of 
modern production.  It reconfigured the factory floor 
based on value stream mapping and 5-S principles, broke 
production into cells, eliminated stockrooms, 
implemented Kanban, and adopted Takt time analyses to 
organize workflow [these are all forms of lean/modern 
manufacturing techniques]. 
(2) Modern manufacturing, rationale 
   a)  Can you take through the rationale to introduce these processes? 
b)  What factors led to the adoption of these lean (modern) management practices? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid:  Modern manufacturing techniques were 
introduced because others were using them. 
Modern manufacturing techniques were 
introduced to reduce costs 
Modern manufacturing techniques were introduced to 
enable us to meet our business objectives (including 
costs) 
 Examples:  A German firm introduced modern 
techniques because all its competitors were 
using these techniques. The business 
decision had been taken to imitate the 
competition.  
A French firm introduced modern 
manufacturing methods primarily to reduce 
costs. 
A US firm implemented lean techniques because the 
COO had worked with them before and knew that they 
would enable the business to reduce costs, competing 
with cheaper imports through improved quality, flexible 
production, greater innovation and JIT delivery.   43
 
(3) Process problem documentation 
   a)  How would you go about improving the manufacturing process itself? 
b)  How do problems typically get exposed and fixed? 
c)  Talk me through the process for a recent problem. 
d)  Do the staff ever suggest process improvements? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid:  No, process improvements are made when 
problems occur. 
Improvements are made in one week 
workshops involving all staff, to improve 
performance in their area of the plant 
Exposing problems in a structured way is integral to 
individuals’ responsibilities and resolution occurs as a 
part of normal business processes rather than by 
extraordinary effort/teams 
 
 Examples:  A US firm has no formal or informal 
mechanism in place for either process 
documentation or improvement.  The 
manager admitted that production takes 
place in an environment where nothing has 
been done to encourage or support process 
innovation. 
A US firm takes suggestions via an 
anonymous box, they then review these each 
week in their section meeting and decide any 
that they would like to proceed with. 
The employees of a German firm constantly analyse the 
production process as part of their normal duty. They 
film critical production steps to analyse areas more 
thoroughly.  Every problem is registered in a special 
database that monitors critical processes and each issue 
must be reviewed and signed off by a manager. 
(4) Performance tracking 
    a)  Tell me how you track production performance? 
b)  What kind of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) would you use for performance tracking? How frequently are these measured? Who gets to see 
this KPI data? 
c)  If I were to walk through your factory could I tell how you were doing against your KPI’s? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  Measures tracked do not indicate directly if 
overall business objectives are being met. 
Tracking is an ad-hoc process (certain 
processes aren’t tracked at all) 
 
Most key performance indicators are tracked 
formally. Tracking is overseen by senior 
management.  
Performance is continuously tracked and communicated, 
both formally and informally, to all staff using a range of 
visual management tools. 
  Examples:  A manager of a US firm tracks a range of 
measures when he does not think that 
output is sufficient. He last requested these 
reports about 8 months ago and had them 
printed for a week until output increased 
again. 
At a US firm every product is bar-coded and 
performance indicators are tracked 
throughout the production process; however, 
this information is not communicated to 
workers 
A US firm has screens in view of every line. These 
screens are used to display progress to daily target and 
other performance indicators. The manager meets with 
the shop floor every morning to discuss the day past and 
the one ahead and uses monthly company meetings to 
present a larger view of the goals to date and strategic 
direction of the business to employees. He even stamps 
napkins with key performance achievements to ensure 
everyone is aware of a target that has been hit.   44
 
(5) Performance review 
    a)  How do you review your Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)? 
b)  Tell me about a recent meeting 
c)  Who is involved in these meetings? Who gets to see the results of this review? 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  Performance is reviewed infrequently or in 
an un-meaningful way, e.g. only success or 
failure is noted. 
Performance is reviewed periodically with 
successes and failures identified.  Results are 
communicated to senior management. No 
clear follow-up plan is adopted. 
 
Performance is continually reviewed, based on indicators 
tracked.  All aspects are followed up ensure continuous 
improvement. Results are communicated to all staff 
  Examples:  A manager of a US firm relies heavily on 
his gut feel of the business. He will review 
costs when he thinks there is too much or 
too little in the stores. He admits he is busy 
so reviews are infrequent. He also 
mentioned staffs feel like he is going on a 
hunt to find a problem, so he has now made 
a point of highlighting anything good. 
A UK firm uses daily production meetings to 
compare performance to plan.  However, 
clear action plans are infrequently developed 
based on these production results. 
A French firm tracks all performance numbers real time 
(amount, quality etc). These numbers are continuously 
matched to the plan on a shift-by-shift basis. Every 
employee can access these figures on workstations on 
the shop floor. If scheduled numbers are not met, action 
for improvement is taken immediately. 
(6) Performance dialogue 
    a)  How are these meetings structured? Tell me about your most recent meeting. 
b)  During these meeting, how much useful data do you have? 
c)  How useful do you find problem solving meetings? 
d)  What type of feedback occurs in these meetings? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  The right data or information for a 
constructive discussion is often not present 
or conversations overly focus on data that is 
not meaningful. Clear agenda is not known 
and purpose is not stated explicitly 
Review conversations are held with the 
appropriate data and information present. 
Objectives of meetings are clear to all 
participating and a clear agenda is present. 
Conversations do not, as a matter of course, 
drive to the root causes of the problems. 
 
Regular review/performance conversations focus on 
problem solving and addressing root causes. Purpose, 
agenda and follow-up steps are clear to all. Meetings are 
an opportunity for constructive feedback and coaching. 
  Examples:  A US firm does not conduct staff reviews. 
It was just “not the philosophy of the 
company” to do that. The company was 
very successful during the last decade and 
therefore did not feel the need to review 
their performance.  
A UK firm focuses on key areas to discuss 
each week. This ensures they receive 
consistent management attention and 
everyone comes prepared. However, 
meetings are more of an opportunity for 
everyone to stay abreast of current issues 
rather than problem solve. 
A German firm meets weekly to discuss performance 
with workers and management. Participants come from 
all departments (shop floor, sales, R&D, procurement 
etc.) to discuss the previous week performance and to 
identify areas to improve. They focus on the cause of 
problems and agree topics to be followed up the next 
week, allocating all tasks to individual participants.   45
 
(7) Consequence management    
    a)  What happens if there is a part of the business (or a manager) who isn’t achieving agreed upon results? Can you give me a recent example? 
b)  What kind of consequences would follow such an action? 
c)  Are there are any parts of the business (or managers) that seem to repeatedly fail to carry out agreed actions? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  Failure to achieve agreed objectives does 
not carry any consequences 
Failure to achieve agreed results is tolerated 
for a period before action is taken. 
A failure to achieve agreed targets drives retraining in 
identified areas of weakness or moving individuals to 
where their skills are appropriate 
 
  Examples:  At a French firm, no action is taken when 
objectives are not achieved. The President 
personally intervenes to warn employees 
but no stricter action is taken. Cutting 
payroll or making people redundant 
because of a lack of performance is very 
rarely done.  
Management of a US firm reviews 
performance quarterly. That is the earliest 
they can react to any underperformance. 
They increase pressure on the employees if 
targets are not met. 
A German firm takes action as soon as a weakness is 
identified. They have even employed a psychologist to 
improve behavior within a difficult group. People 
receive ongoing training to improve performance. If this 
doesn’t help they move them in other departments or 
even fire individuals if they repeatedly fail to meet 
agreed targets  
(8) Target balance    
    a)  What types of targets are set for the company? What are the goals for your plant? 
b)  Tell me about the financial and non-financial goals? 
c)  What does Company Head Quarters (CHQ) or their appropriate manager emphasize to you? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  Goals are exclusively financial or 
operational 
Goals include non-financial targets, which 
form part of the performance appraisal of top 
management only (they are not reinforced 
throughout the rest of organization) 
Goals are a balance of financial and non-financial 
targets. Senior managers believe the non-financial 
targets are often more inspiring and challenging than 
financials alone. 
 
  Examples:  At a UK, firm performance targets are 
exclusively operational.  Specifically 
volume is the only meaningful objective for 
managers, with no targeting of quality, 
flexibility or waste. 
For French firm strategic goals are very 
important. They focus on market share and 
try to hold their position in technology 
leadership. However, workers on the shop 
floor are not aware of those targets. 
A US firm gives everyone a mix of operational and 
financial targets. They communicate financial targets to 
the shop floor in a way they found effective – for 
example telling workers they pack boxes to pay the 
overheads until lunchtime and after lunch it is all profit 
for the business. If they are having a good day the boards 
immediately adjust and play the “profit jingle” to let the 
shop floor know that they are now working for profit. 
Everyone cheers when the jingle is played.   46
 
(9)  Target interconnection    
   a)  What is the motivation behind your goals? 
b)  How are these goals cascaded down to the individual workers? 
c)  What are the goals of the top management team (do they even know what they are!)? 
d)  How are your targets linked to company performance and their goals? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid: Goals are based purely on accounting 
figures (with no clear connection to 
shareholder value) 
Corporate goals are based on shareholder 
value but are not clearly communicated 
down to individuals 
 
 
Corporate goals focus on shareholder value. They 
increase in specificity as they cascade through business 
units ultimately defining individual performance 
expectations. 
 Examples:  A family owned firm in France is only 
concerned about the net income for the 
year. They try to maximize income every 
year without focusing on any long term 
consequences. 
A US firm bases its strategic corporate goals 
on enhancing shareholder value, but does not 
clearly communicate this to workers.  
Departments and individuals have little 
understanding of their connection to 
profitability or value with many areas 
labeled as “cost-centers” with an objective to 
cost-cut despite potentially 
disproportionately large negative impact on 
the other departments they serve. 
For a US firm strategic planning begins with a bottom up 
approach that is then compared with the top down aims. 
Multifunctional teams meet every 6 months to track and 
plan deliverables for each area. This is then presented to 
the area head that then agrees or refines it and then 
communicates it down to his lowest level. Everyone has 
to know exactly how he or she contributes to the overall 
goals or else they will not understand how important the 
10 hours they spend at work every day is to the business.  
(10) Target time horizon    
    a)  What kind of time scale are you looking at with your targets? 
b)  Which goals receive the most emphasis? 
c)  How are long term goals linked to short term goals? 
d)  Could you meet all your short-run goals but miss your long-run goals? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  Top management's main focus is on short 
term targets 
There are short and long-term goals for all 
levels of the organization. As they are set 
independently, they are not necessarily 
linked to each other 
 
Long  term goals are translated into specific short term 
targets so that short term targets become a "staircase" to 
reach long term goals 
  Examples:  A UK firm has had several years of 
ongoing senior management changes – 
therefore senior managers are only focusing 
on how the company is doing this month 
versus the next, believing that long-term 
targets will take care of themselves. 
A US firm has both long and short-term 
goals. The senior managers know the long-
term goals and the short-term goals are the 
remit of the operational managers. 
Operations managers only occasionally see 
the longer-term goals so are often unsure 
how they link with the short term goals. 
A UK firm translates all their goals – even their 5-year 
strategic goals - into short-term goals so they can track 
their performance to them. They believe that it is only 
when you make someone accountable for delivery within 
a sensible timeframe that a long-term objective will be 
met. They think it is more interesting for employees to 
have a mix of immediate and longer-term goals.   47
(11) Targets are stretching    
    a)  How tough are your targets? Do you feel pushed by them? 
b)  On average, how often would you say that you meet your targets? 
c)  Are there any targets which are obviously too easy (will always be met) or too hard (will never be met)? 
d)  Do you feel that on targets that all groups receive the same degree of difficulty? Do some groups get easy targets? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  Goals are either too easy or impossible to 
achieve; managers provide low estimates to 
ensure easy goals 
In most areas, top management pushes for 
aggressive goals based on solid economic 
rationale. There are a few "sacred cows" that 
are not held to the same rigorous standard 
 
Goals are genuinely demanding for all divisions. They 
are grounded in solid, solid economic rationale 
  Examples:  A French firm uses easy targets to improve 
staff morale and encourage people. They 
find it difficult to set harder goals because 
people just give up and managers refuse to 
work people harder. 
A chemicals firm has 2 divisions, producing 
special chemicals for very different markets 
(military, civil). Easier levels of targets are 
requested from the founding and more 
prestigious military division.  
A manager of a UK firm insisted that he has to set 
aggressive and demanding goals for everyone – even 
security. If they hit all their targets he worries he has not 
stretched them enough. Each KPI is linked to the overall 
business plan. 
(12) Performance clarity    
    a)  What are your targets (i.e. do they know them exactly)? Tell me about them in full. 
b)  Does everyone know their targets? Does anyone complain that the targets are too complex? 
c)  How do people know about their own performance compared to other people’s performance? 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  Performance measures are complex and not 
clearly understood. Individual performance 
is not made public 
Performance measures are well defined and 
communicated; performance is public in all 
levels but comparisons are discouraged 
Performance measures are well defined, strongly 
communicated and reinforced at all reviews;  
performance and rankings are made public to induce 
competition 
 
  Examples:  A German firm measures performance per 
employee based on differential weighting 
across 12 factors, each with its own 
measurement formulas (e.g.  Individual 
versus average of the team, increase on 
prior performance, thresholds etc.). 
Employees complain the formula is too 
complex to understand, and even the plant 
manager could not remember all the details. 
A French firm does not encourage simple 
individual performance measures as unions 
pressure them to avoid this. However, charts 
display the actual overall production process 
against the plan for teams on regular basis. 
At a US firm self-directed teams set and monitor their 
own goals.  These goals and their subsequent outcomes 
are posted throughout the company, encouraging 
competition in both target setting and achievement. 
Individual members know where they are ranked which 
is communicated personally to them bi-annually. 
Quarterly company meetings seek to review performance 
and align targets.   48
 
(13) Managing human capital    
   a)  Do senior managers discuss attracting and developing talented people? 
b)  Do senior managers get any rewards for bringing in and keeping talented people in the company? 
c)  Can you tell me about the talented people you have developed within your team? Did you get any rewards for this? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid: Senior management do not communicate 
that attracting, retaining and developing 
talent throughout the organization is a top 
priority 
Senior management believe and 
communicate that having top talent 
throughout the organization is a key way to 
win 
 
Senior managers are evaluated and held accountable on 
the strength of the talent pool they actively build 
 Examples:  A US firm does not actively train or 
develop its employees, and does not 
conduct performance appraisals or 
employee reviews. People are seen as a 
secondary input to the production. 
A US firm strives to attract and retain talent 
throughout the organization, but does not 
hold managers individually accountable for 
the talent pool they build. The company 
actively cross-trains employees for 
development and challenges them through 
exposure to a variety of technologies. 
A UK firm benchmarks human resources practices at 
leading firms.  A cross-functional HR excellence 
committee develops policies and strategies to achieve 
company goals.  Bi-monthly directors’ meetings seek to 
identify training and development opportunities for 
talented performers. 
(14) Rewarding high-performance    
   a)  How does you appraisal system work? Tell me about the most recent round? 
b)  How does the bonus system work? 
c)  Are there any non-financial rewards for top-performers? 
d)  How does your reward system compare to your competitors? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid: People within our firm are rewarded 
equally irrespective of performance level 
Our company has an evaluation system for 
the awarding of performance related rewards 
We strive to outperform the competitors by providing 
ambitious stretch targets with clear performance related 
accountability and rewards 
 
 Examples:  An East Germany firm pays its people 
equally and regardless of performance. The 
management said to us “there are no 
incentives to perform well in our 
company”. Even the management is paid an 
hourly wage, with no bonus pay. 
A German firm has an awards system based 
on three components: the individual’s 
performance, shift performance, and overall 
company performance.  
A US firm sets ambitious targets, rewarded through a 
combination of bonuses linked to performance, team 
lunches cooked by management, family picnics, movie 
passes and dinner vouchers at nice local restaurants. 
They also motivate staff to try by giving awards for 
perfect attendance, best suggestion etc.   49
 
(15) Removing  poor performers    
   a)  If you had a worker who could not do his job what would you do? Could you give me a recent example? 
b)  How long would underperformance be tolerated? 
c)  Do you find any workers who lead a sort of charmed life? Do some individuals always just manage to avoid being fixed/fired? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid: Poor performers are rarely removed from 
their positions  
Suspected poor performers stay in a position 
for a few years before action is taken 
We move poor performers out of the company or to less 
critical roles as soon as a weakness is identified 
 
 Examples:  A French firm had a supervisor who was 
regularly drinking alcohol at work but no 
action was taken to help him or move him. 
In fact, no employee had ever been laid off 
in the factory. According to the plant 
manager HR “kicked up a real fuss” 
whenever management wanted to get rid of 
employees, and told managers their job was 
production not personnel. 
For a German firm it is very hard to remove 
poor performers. The management has to 
prove at least three times that an individual 
underperformed before they can take serious 
action.  
At a US firm, the manager fired four people during last 
couple of months due to underperformance. They 
continually investigate why and who are 
underperforming. 
(16) Promoting high performers    
   a)  Can you rise up the company rapidly if you are really good? Are there any examples you can think of? 
b)  What about poor performers – do they get promoted more slowly? Are there any examples you can think of? 
c)  How would you identify and develop (i.e. train) your star performers? 
d)  If two people both joined the company 5 years ago and one was much better than the other would he/she be promoted faster? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid: People are promoted primarily upon the 
basis of tenure  
People are promoted upon the basis of 
performance 
We actively identify, develop and promote our top 
performers  
 
 Examples:  A UK firm promotes based on an 
individual’s commitment to the company 
measured by experience. Hence, almost all 
employees move up the firm in lock step. 
Management was afraid to change this 
process because it would create bad feeling 
among the older employees who were 
resistant to change. 
A US firm has no formal training program. 
People learn on the job and are promoted 
based on their performance on the job. 
At a UK firm each employee is given a red light (not 
performing), amber light (doing well and meeting 
targets) a green light (consistently meeting targets very 
high performer) and a blue light (high performer capable 
of promotion of up to two levels). Each manager is 
assessed every quarter based on his succession plans and 
development plans for individuals.   50
 
(17) Attracting human capital     
   a)  What makes it distinctive to work at your company as opposed to your competitors? 
b)  If you were trying to sell your firm to me how would you do this (get them to try to do this)? 
c)  What don’t people like about working in your firm? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid: Our competitors offer stronger reasons for 
talented people to join their companies 
Our value proposition to those joining our 
company is comparable to those offered by 
others in the sector 
 
We provide a unique value proposition to encourage 
talented people join our company above our competitors 
 Examples:  A manager of a firm in Germany could not 
give an example of a distinctive employee 
proposition and (when pushed) thinks the 
offer is worse than most of its competitors. 
He thought that people working at the firm 
“have drawn the short straw”.  
A US firm seeks to create a value 
proposition comparable to its competitors 
and other local companies by offering 
competitive pay, a family atmosphere, and a 
positive presence in the community.  
A German firm offers a unique value proposition 
through development and training programs, family 
culture in the company and very flexible working hours. 
It also strives to reduce bureaucracy and seeks to push 
decision making down to the lowest levels possible to 
make workers feel empowered and valued. 
(18) Retaining human capital    
   a)  If you had a star performer who wanted to leave what would the company do?  
b)  Could you give me an example of a star performers being persuaded to stay after wanting to leave? 
c)  Could you give me an example of a star performer who left the company without anyone trying to keep them? 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid: 
 
We do little to try to keep our top talent.  We usually work hard to keep our top talent.  We do whatever it takes to retain our top talent.  
 Examples:  A German firm lets people leave the 
company if they want. They do nothing to 
keep those people since they think that it 
would make no sense to try to keep them. 
Management does not think they can keep 
people if they want to work somewhere 
else. The company also will not start salary 
negotiations to retain top talent. 
If management of a French firm feels that 
people want to leave the company, they talk 
to them about their reasons for leaving and 
what the company could change to keep 
them. This could be more responsibilities or 
a better outlook for the future. Managers are 
supposed to “take-the-pulse” of employees 
to check satisfaction levels. 
A US firm knows who its top performers are. If any of 
them signal an interest to leave the firm pulls in senior 
managers and even corporate Head Quarters to talk to 
them and try and persuade them to stay. Occasionally 
they will increase salary rates if necessary and if they 
feel the individual is being underpaid relative to the 
market. Managers have a responsibility to try to keep all 
desirable staff. 
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TABLE A2: QUESTION LEVEL AVERAGES BY COUNTRY 
 




Average Value by Country 
(US = 100) 
Regression 
Coefficients 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Countries     UK  Germany  France  All 
Modern manufacturing, 
introduction 
















   0.012 
(0.008) 






   0.032***
(0.009) 






   0.017** 
(0.008) 





(3.10)     0.018** 
(0.008) 





(3.27)   
 0.017** 
(0.009) 





(3.13)   
 0.017** 
(0.008) 





(3.66)   
 0.024***
(0.008) 





(3.68)     0.025***
(0.008) 





(3.83)     0.021***
(0.009) 





(3.45)     0.014* 
(0.008) 
Performance clarity and 
comparability 





(3.65)   
 0.009 
(0.008) 















(3.55)   
 0.021** 
(0.009) 





(3.15)     0.012 
(0.009) 





(2.97)     0.015* 
(0.009) 





(2.99)     0.029***
(0.009) 





(2.84)     0.006 
(0.009) 
Unweighted Average     91.5 98.7 93.8      0.018 
NOTES: In columns (1) to (3) standard deviation of each question’s average response are reported below in brackets. 
Calculated from full sample of 732 firms. Management z-scores used in these calculations. In column (4) results from 18 
OLS estimations following exactly the same specification as column (4) Table 2 except estimated with each individual 
question z-score one-by-one rather than the average management z-score. So every cell in column (4) is from a different 
regression with 5,350 observations from 709 firms where: standard errors in parentheses allow for arbitrary heteroskedacity 
and correlation (clustered by firm), and regression includes “general controls” as detailed in Table 2. *** denotes that the 
variable is significant at the 1% level, ** denotes 5% significance and * denotes 10% significance.   52
APPENDIX A3: HUMAN RESOURCES INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Run in parallel as the management survey but targeted at the HR department 
Workforce Characteristics 
Data Field       Breakdown 
Total number of employees (cross-check again accounts)  (all employees) 
% with university degree         (all employees) 
%  with  MBA       (all  employees) 
Average  age  of  employees     (all  employees) 
%  of  employees        (managerial/non-managerial) 
Average training days per year     (managerial/non-managerial) 
Average hours worked per week (including overtime, excluding breaks)  (managerial/non-managerial) 
Average  holidays  per  year     (all  employees) 
Weeks  maternity  leave      (all  employees) 
Weeks  paternity  leave      (all  employees) 
Average  days  sick-leave      (all  employees) 
%   p a r t - t i m e        ( m a n agerial/non-managerial) 
%   f e m a l e        ( m a n agerial/non-managerial) 
%  employees  abroad      (all  employees) 
%  union  membership      (all  employees) 
Are unions recognized for wages bargaining [yes / no]  (all employees) 
Work-life Balance: Perceptions 
Question       Response  choice  (all  employees) 
Relative to other companies in your industry  [much less / slightly less / the same / slightly 
how much does your company emphasize   more / much more] 
work-life balance?  
Organizational Characteristics  
Question       Response  choice  (all  employees) 
Who decides the pace of work?     [exclusively workers / mostly workers / equally /
  mostly managers / exclusively managers] 
Who decides how tasks should be allocated?    [exclusively workers / mostly workers/ equally /
  mostly managers / exclusively managers] 
Do you use self-managing teams?  [v. heavily / heavily / moderately / slightly / none] 
Market & firm questions:     Response choice 
# of competitors          [none / less than 5 / 5 or more] 
# hostile take-over bids in last three years      [none / one / more than one ] 
Interviewer’s assessment of the scoring reliability 
1 to 5 scoring system calibrated according to: 
1   =  Interviewee did not have enough expertise for interview to be valuable; I have significant doubts about 
most of the management dimensions probed] 
3  =   Interviewee had reasonable expertise; on some dimensions I am unsure of scoring 
5  =   Interviewee had good expertise, I am confident that the score reflects management practices in this firm   53
APPENDIX A4: FAMILY INVOLVEMENT DATA GUIDE 
 
Run subsequently to the management survey and collected from company accounts, public sources and 
telephones interviews primarily conducted with the CEO or his office. 
 
CEO characteristics 
CEO  is  a  family  member       [yes/no] 
CEO  family  generation       continuous 
C E O   a g e        c o n t i n u o u s  
CEO  tenure        continuous 
CEO worked at another company previously       [yes/no] 
CEO  has  a  university  degree      [yes/no] 
CEO shares name with the firm          [yes/no] 
CEO  also  Chairman       [yes/no] 
 
Chairperson characteristics 
Chairperson  is  a  family  member      [yes/no] 
Chairperson  family  generation      continuous 
Chairperson  age        continuous 
Chairperson  tenure       continuous 
Chairperson shares name with the firm        [yes/no] 
 
Other directors 
Number  of  other  family  directors      continuous 
Total  number  of  directors       continuous 
 
Family ownership 
%  of  family  ownership       continuous 
%  largest  family  shareholder      continuous 
% second largest family shareholder        continuous 
%  largest  outside  shareholder      continuous 




Number of siblings (of current CEO)        continuous 
How was the management of the firm passed down: was it to the  text 
eldest son or by some other way?  
Year  of  last  handover       continuous 
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APPENDIX B: DATA 
 
The entire anonymized dataset with a full set of do-files generating all results in this paper 
will be made available on-line after publication of his paper. 
 
Sampling Frame Construction 
 
Our sampling frame was based on the Amadeus dataset for Europe (UK, France and 
Germany) and the Compustat dataset for the USA. These all have information on company 
accounting data. We chose firms whose principal industry was in manufacturing and who 
employed (on average between 2000 and 2003) no less than 50 employees and no more than 
10,000 employees.  We also removed any clients of the consultancy firm we worked with 
from the sampling frame (33 out of 1,353 firms). 
 
Our sampling frame is reasonably representative of medium sized manufacturing firms. The 
European firms in Amadeus include both private and public firms whereas Compustat only 
includes publicly listed firms. There is no US database with privately listed firms with 
information on sales, labor and capital. Fortunately, there are a much larger proportion of 
firms are listed on the stock exchange in the U S  t h a n  i n  E u r o p e  s o  w e  a r e  a b l e  t o  g o  
substantially down the size distribution using Compustat. Nevertheless, the US firms in our 
sample are slightly larger than those of the other countries, so we are always careful to control 
for size and public listing in the analyses. Furthermore, when estimating production functions 
we allow all coefficients to be different on labor, capital, materials and consolidation status by 
country (see notes to Table 2). 
 
Another concern is that we condition on firms where we have information on sales, 
employment and capital. These items are not compulsory for firms below certain size 
thresholds so disclosure is voluntary to some extent for the smaller firms. By design, the firms 
in our sampling frame (over 50 workers) are past this threshold for voluntary disclosure (the 
only exception is for capital in Germany).  
 
We achieved a response rate of 54% from the firms that we contacted: a very high success 
rate given the voluntary nature of participation.  Respondents were not significantly more 
productive than non-responders. French firms were slightly less likely to respond than firms 
in the other three countries were and all respondents were significantly larger than non-
respondents. Apart from these two factors, respondents seemed randomly spread around our 
sampling frame 
 
Firm level data 
 
Our firm accounting data on sales, employment, capital, profits, shareholder equity, long-term 
debt, market values (for quoted firms) and wages (where available) came from Amadeus 
(France, Germany and the UK) and Compustat (US). For other data fields we did the 
following: 
Materials: In France and Germany, these are line items in the accounts. In the UK, these were 
constructed by deducting the total wage bill from the cost of goods sold. In the US, these were 
constructed following the method in Bresnahan et al. (2002). We start with costs of good sold   55
(COGS) less depreciation (DP) less labor costs (XLR). For firms who do not report labor 
expenses expenditures we use average wages and benefits at the four-digit industry level 
(Bartelsman, Becker and Gray, 2000, until 1996 and then Census Average Production Worker 
Annual Payroll by 4-digit NAICS code) and multiply this by the firm's reported employment 
level. This constructed measure is highly correlated at the industry level with materials. 
Obviously there may be problems with this measure of materials (and therefore value added) 
which is why we check robustness to measures without materials. 
Company Shareholdings: This was manually extracted from the Bloomberg online data 
service for the ten largest shareholders and the ten largest insider shareholders. 
Dates of Incorporation: For UK, French and German companies this is provided by Amadeus 
datasets. For the US, this was obtained from Dunn and Bradstreet. 
Family ownership data 
The ownership data, directors’ data, shareholder information and family generation was 
collected from company SEC filings (particularly the DEF14a), company databases 
(Compustat and ICARUS in the US, AMADEUS in the UK, France and Germany), company 
websites, and The International Directory of Company Histories (St. James Press) and 
Moody’s Manuals (Moody’s Investor Service). When this data was missing or ambiguous this 
was supplemented with information from the family firm telephone survey, which was run on 
around 300 firms in the sample who were (or potentially were) family owned.
67 This allowed 
us to separate firms into the three family firm categories: “Family largest shareholder” firms 
defined as those with a single family (combined across all family members, whom are all 
second generation or beyond) as the largest shareholder; “Family largest shareholder and 
family CEO” firms as those with additionally a family member as the CEO; “Family largest 
shareholder, family CEO and primo geniture” who additionally the CEO selected as the 
eldest male child upon succession. 
CEO Pay and Age: In the US, the S&P 1500 largest firms (which cover all sectors) are 
contained in Execucomp, which provided data for 106 largest of our US firms. For the 
remaining firms we manually downloaded the Def14a proxy statements from the SEC to 
extract the details of the CEO and CFO compensation package and age over the last three 
accounting years
68. In the UK, the highest paid director is a mandatory line item in the 
accounts and we took this as the CEO’s salary. In France and Germany we have no data on 
executive pay. 
 
Industry level data 
This comes from the OECD STAN database of industrial production. This is provided at the 
country ISIC Revision 3 level and is mapped into US SIC (1997) three (which is our common 
industry definition in all four countries). The measure of competition we use are “Import 
Penetration” = ln(Import/Production) in every country*industry pair (i.e. 4 countries and 108 
industries implies up to 432 cells). We use the average over 1995-1999. “Lerner index of 
competition” constructed, as in Aghion et al. (2005), as the mean of (1 - profit/sales) in the 
entire database (excluding the firm itself) for every country industry pair (average over 1995-
1999 used). 
 
A full set of descriptive statistics are in Table B1. 
                                                 
67 Many thanks to Kevin Krabbenhoeft, Timo Hiller and Mohamed Moharram for the family firm surveys. 
68 Many thanks to Guy Clark, Jatin Gulati, Sejal Mehta and Rahul Rathi for the construction of this and the 
Bloomberg share-ownership data.   56
 
TABLE B1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
      
 All  France  Germany  UK  US 
Number of firms, #  732  135 156 151  290 
Management (mean z score)   -0.001 -0.084  0.032  -0.150 0.097 
Employment (mean)  1,984 1,213  1,816  1,735 2,569 
Tobin’s Q  1.71  1.16 1.86 2.01  0.88 
Nominal sales growth rate, %  6.0  5.4 3.8 6.8  7.2 
Age of firm (years)  53.4  38.6 86.8 44.7  48.4 
Share workforce with degrees, %  21.2  15.5 14.3 14.0  31.0 
Share workforce with an MBA, %  1.36  0.23 0.09 1.28  2.73 
Sickness,  days/year  6.80  8.16 8.51 6.21  5.01 
Hours, hours per week  40.7  35.6 38.6 40.8  44.1 
Holidays,  days per year   22.7  32.2 29.7 26.9  12.4 
Number of competitors index, 
1=”none”, 2=”a few”, 3=”many”  2.47  2.32 2.35 2.52  2.56 
Lerner index , excluding the firm 
itself in three digit industry  0.055 0.040  0.071  0.040 0.060 
Trade Openness (imports/output) 
in three digit industry  0.31  0.33 0.32 0.42  0.24 
Union density, %  19.9 9.7  41.4 25.3 9.4 
Listed firm,%  57.2  16.1 41.0 28.5  100 
         
Notes: Data descriptive calculated on the full sample of 732 firms for which management information is available.   57
APPENDIX C: MEASUREMENT ERROR AND NOISE 
CONTROLS 
 
Decomposing Variation and Measurement Error 
 
We decompose the variation in the question level z-scores  ij q into four components 
ij i ij i ij e u p m q + + + =   (where subscript i denotes firm and j denotes practice): the average 
firm management practice  i m ; the practice (i.e. question) specific deviations from the average 
firm management practice ij p  where ∑ = 0 ij p ; the average firm-level measure error  i u ; and 
the practice specific deviation in measurement error from the firm average measurement error 
ij e  where ∑ = 0 ij e . 
 
Assuming that the practice deviations and measurement error deviations are i.i.d. within firms 
(although not across firms), we can decompose the variance in  ij q as 
2 2 2 2 1 e u p m σ σ σ σ + + + =  
using the fact that z-scores have a variance of one. To determine these values of these 
components we exploit the information in the first and second interviews and the variance of 
question scores within and between firms. 
 
At the question level the regression coefficient from the first on the second interview 
responses will take the value  2 2 2 2
2 2
e u p m
p m





= , from applying the standard result on 
the attenuation bias due to measurement error. The average coefficient
69 from the first on 
second interviews and the second on first interviews is 0.578. At the firm level the regression 
coefficient of the first interview average scores on the second interview average scores will 








= . The average coefficient from the first on second and second on 
first interviews is 0.752. Finally, decomposing the variance in question scores within and 
between firms provides values on 
2 2
u m σ σ +  and 
2 2
e p σ σ +  of 0.466 and 0.534. 
 
Combining these three results together with the definition of the variances allows us to 
calculate 
2
m σ = 0.350, 
2
p σ = 0.228, 
2
u σ = 0.116, and
2
e σ = 0.306. Thus, we estimate the ratio of 
variation from management practices to measurement error to be 58:42 at the question level. 
This ratio rises to 75:25 at the firm level due to the higher correlation of management 
practices than measurement error across questions within the firm. Interestingly the variation 
in these management practices is driven both by changes in firm average management 
practices (61%) and in firm specific practice capabilities (39%). 
 
                                                 
69 The regression of the first interview questions on the second interview questions provides an estimate of the 
measurement error in the second interviews, while the regression of the second on first interview questions 
provides an estimate of the measurement error in the first interview. Taking the average coefficient from these 
two regressions provides a sample average of the measurement error.   58
Table C1 below contains a list of interviewer, interview and interviewee characteristics as 
described in III.E. Column (1) reports the results of an OLS regression where the dependent 
variable is the average management z-score in the firm. The coefficient and standard errors of 
each of the variables are reported. Column (2) drops the least significant variables from the 
regression. We use these variables as “noise controls” in some of the regressions.   59
 
TABLE C1: CONTROLS FOR MEASUREMENT ERROR 
 
Dependent variable is Management z-score 
     (1)  (2) 
Explanatory Variable  Definition  Mean   Coefficient (s.e.)   Coefficient (s.e.) 




Seniority  The position of manager in the 








Tenure in the company  Years with the company  11.7  0.002 
(0.004)   
Countries  Total number of countries 




Organizations  Total number of organizations 
worked in over last ten years  1.66  -0.009 
(0.032)   
Manager is foreign  Manager was born outside the 
country s/he works  0.032  -0.048 
(0.142)   
Ever worked in USA  The manager has worked in the 
USA at some point  0.425  0.103 
(0.152)   
Location of manager  Manager based on site (rather 
than in corporate HQ)  0.778  0.011 
(0.063)   
Tuesday  Day of the week that interview 






Day of the week that interview 






Day of the week that interview 




Friday  Day of the week that interview 




Local time for manager  The time of the day (24 hour 




Days from start of 
project 
Count of days since start of the 
project  39  0.001 
(0.001)   
Duration of interview  The length of the interview with 




Number of contacts  Number of telephone calls to 
arrange the interview  5.73  0.007 
(0.006)   
Reliability score  Interviewer’s subjective ranking 










NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity); 
single cross section; 3 country dummies and 108 three digit industry dummies included in the regression; 732 observations. 
Seniority scores defined by 1=”Technician/Engineer”, 2=”Manufacturing/Production manager”, 3=”Plant/Factory manager”, 
4=”VP/General manager” and 5=”Director/CEO”. 
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 APPENDIX  D: ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
 
In this Appendix, we give some additional results that we refer to in the main text (Section 
IV.B), but did not have room to discuss in detail. In Table D1, we present alternative 
estimates of the production function. Column 1 simply reports the OLS levels regression that 
is comparable with column (4) of Table 2
70 .  
 
In the rest of the table, we implement the two stage estimates described in Section 4 of the 
text. In the first stage, we estimate the production function: 
 
it i it n it k it l it u n k l y + + + + = η α α α                                            (D1) 
 
We recover our estimates of the fixed effects, i η , and then in a second stage we project the 
fixed effects on the time invariant variables including the management score, M. The upper 
panel of Table D1 (Panel A) shows the “first stage” results of the production function. The 
lower panel (Panel B) shows the results of the “second stage” regression.  
 
Within groups estimates equation (D1) directly, GMM System follows Blundell Bond (2000) 
and allows the  it u  to follow an AR (1) process,  it it it u u ε ρ + = −1 , where  it ε  is a serially 
uncorrelated error.  We estimate a general dynamic model with a lagged dependent variable 
and lags of all the factor inputs:  
 
it i it it it it it it it n n k k l l y ε η π π π π π π + + + + + + + = − − −
*
1 6 5 1 4 3 1 2 1                   (D2)  
 
We use the moment conditions suggested by Arellano-Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) treating all factor inputs as endogenous. The underlying parameters of the production 
function in equation (D1) are recovered by imposing the Common Factor restrictions in 
equation (D2) by Minimum Distance. We can then estimate the fixed effects and proceed to 
the second step regression as before. 
 
In Olley-Pakes (1996) the unobserved productivity term is allowed to evolve over time in a 
first order Markov process. In this case we estimate the efficiency term for each firm-year and 
then average this over the eleven years in our data.  
 
Note that we have also experimented with estimating the results in Table D1 for just the 1999-
2004 periods instead of the 1994-2004 period that lead to very similar results. 
 
Column (2) of Table D1 presents the within group results where we have included a full set of 
firm fixed effects. Compared to OLS levels the coefficient on capital falls by over 50 per cent 
and the coefficient on labour rises. This is typical of within group estimates of production 
functions and is suggestive of attenuation bias in the capital stock measure that becomes 
                                                 
70 The minor differences with Table 2 are because we impose the same coefficients on the factor inputs across 
countries in order to ease comparability with the other estimators – this makes practically no difference to the 
results on the management term.   61
exacerbated when moving from OLS to within groups. The Olley Pakes results are in column 
(3). The coefficient on capital is higher than in OLS levels and much higher than Within 
Groups. The labor coefficient, by contrast, is lower. This is reassuring, as we would generally 
expect OLS levels (column (1)) to generate an upwards bias in the labor coefficient and a 
downwards bias in the capital coefficient. The GMM System estimator in column (4) also 
generates a lower labor coefficient and higher capital coefficient than within groups
71. 
 
We recover the estimates of the unobserved efficiency terms/fixed effects and project them 
against the management score and other variables in Panel B. In all three columns, there 
remains a significant and positive association of (total factor) productivity with our 
management score. The magnitude of this management coefficient ranges between 0.04 for 
Olley Pakes and 0.08 for Within Groups with GMM system in between (0.07). We conclude 
that using our simpler OLS methods of estimating the association of management and 
productivity in the main text is not misleading. If anything, we may be underestimating the 
importance of management.  
 
The final two columns report the results of a simple test of splitting the sample completely 
into the Continental European observations (France and Germany in column (5)) and Anglo-
American observations (US and UK in column (6)). This is a further test of whether our 
management variables are Anglo-Saxon biased and matter less for the “social markets” of 
France and Germany. We use the Within Groups estimates of column (2). The coefficient on 
the management is significant in both columns and is actually larger in Continental Europe 
than in the UK and US (although not significantly so). We therefore reject the hypothesis that 
our management practice measures are culturally biased against France and Germany (this is 
supported by the fact that one of the Anglo Saxon countries, Britain, has a lower average 
management score than Germany and France).  
 
Table D2 presents extensions to the production functions where we try to control for “firm 
performance related measurement bias”. These are discussed in the text in sib-section IV.D. 
                                                 
71 The similarity of the capital coefficient in GMM System and OLS levels is surprising, but it may because of 
problems with the extra moment conditions for the levels equations in Blundell-Bond. Even though the Sargan 
Difference test fails to reject the null of instrument validity in column (4), it might have weak power to reject. 
We re-estimated the equation using only the differenced moments (Arellano-Bond, 1991). The results were 
similar to the other estimates. The coefficient (standard error) on capital was 0.174(0.064), on labor 0.361(0.054) 
and on materials 0.416(0.057).   62
 
TABLE D1: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES OF THE 
PRODUCTION FUNCTION 















Countries All  All  All  All  France and 
Germany  US and UK 
Dependent 
variable: 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 
Ln (Y) it 
sales 





        










































           
SC(1)p-value       0.000    













General Controls  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  5,350 5,350  3,606  3,674  1,393 3,957 
           






















General Controls  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations    709 709  709  270  439 
            
 
NOTES: In all columns, standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates and allow for arbitrary heteroskedacity 
and correlation (i.e. clustered by firm). The data runs between 1994 and 2004. Column (1) is estimated by OLS levels and we 
also include “general controls” comprising of “firm” controls for ln(hours worked), ln(firm age), a dummy for being listed, a 
dummy for being consolidated, the share of workforce with degrees, the share of workforce with MBAs, 108 three digit 
industry dummies and four country dummies interacted with a full set of time dummies. The controls also include the “Noise 
controls”  from the final column of Table C1 (17 interviewer dummies, the seniority, gender, tenure and number of countries   63
worked in of the manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of the day the interview 
was conducted, the duration of the interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the 
interviewer). All other columns report “two stage” results where, in the first stage individual effects are included in the 
production function and we report the estimated parameters on the factor inputs (Panel A). In the second stage the estimated 
firm-specific efficiency term/“TFP” is regressed against the management z-score and the general controls as described above. 
We report the coefficients and robust standard error for management in Panel B. Columns (2), (5) and (6) are estimated by 
Within Groups. Column (3) implements a version of the Olley-Pakes (1996) technique. We use a third order series 
approximation for φ(.), the non-parametric expansion of capital and investment. We also include a selection correction term 
following Olley and Pakes (1996). Standard errors are bootstrapped (clustered by firm) with 200 replications. After 
calculating the parameters of labor and materials (stage 1a) and capital (stage 1b), we calculate the efficiency term/TFP 
averaged by firm across all year. This is used as a dependent variable in the lower panel and regressed on management and 
the general controls (stage 2). Column (4) shows results from our implementation of the Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM system 
(GMM-SYS) estimator  (stage 1). Instruments for the differenced equation are lagged levels t-2 to t-3 on ln(sales), ln(capital), 
ln(labor) and ln(materials). Instruments for the levels equation are lagged differenced t-1 on ln(sales), ln(capital), ln(labor) 
and ln(materials). Standard errors are the “one step robust” (i.e. allow for clustering by firm). SC(k) is the p-value of an 
LM(k) test of second order correlation of the differenced residuals (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). We find evidence of 
significant negative first order correlation, but no evidence of second order correlation, which is consistent with the validity 
of the instrumentation strategy. SARGAN is the p-value of a Sargan-Hansen test of over-identification (distributed χ
2 under 
the Null). SARGAN-DIF reports the p-value of a Sargan Difference test of the validity of the extra “Blundell-Bond 
moments” over the standard moments in Arellano and Bond (1991). We impose the COMFAC (Common Factor) restrictions 
by Minimum Distance (see Blundell and Bond, 2000).    64
TABLE D2: EVALUATING FIRM PERFORMANCE RELATED MEASUREMENT 
BIAS IN THE MANAGEMENT VARIABLE 
 

















































































































devolvement – tasks 
  





Firms  709 709 709  709  709  709  709 709 
Observations  5,350 5,350 5,350  5,350  5,350  5,350  5,350 5,350 
 
NOTES: In all columns, standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates and allow for arbitrary heteroskedacity 
and correlation (i.e. clustered by firm). All columns estimated by OLS levels and include “full controls” comprising of 
“firm” controls for ln(hours worked), ln(firm age), a dummy for being listed, a dummy for being consolidated the share of 
workforce with degrees, the share of workforce with MBAs, 108 three digit dummies and four country dummies. The 
coefficients on capital, materials and labor are allowed to be different across countries and consolidation status (UK is base). 
Full controls also includes the “noise controls”  of column (2) Table C1 (17 interviewer dummies, the seniority, gender, 
tenure and number of countries worked in of the manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, 
the time of the day the interview was conducted, the duration of the interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the 
information as coded by the interviewer). Management z-score, more “objective” questions  is the average of questions 1, 3, 
4 and 9,  chosen as being arguably the most objective questions in the interview, while Management z-score, least “objective” 
questions is the average of questions 6, 12, 17 and 18, chosen as being arguably the least objective questions in the interview. 
Work-life balance focus is the z-score from the work-life balance question, “Relative to other companies in your industry 
how much does your company emphasize work-life balance?” [much less/slightly less/the same/slightly more/much more], 
graded on a 1 to 5 scale. Organizational devolvement - pace is the z-score from the question “Who decides the pace of 
work?” and Organizational devolvement – task is the z-score from the question “Who decides how tasks should be 








To consider managerial practices and product market competition we will
follow Raith (2003) and consider an oligopoly model with endogenous entry and
allow ﬁrms to choose managerial contracts. If a ﬁrm chooses a "high powered"
contract this will on average elicit greater managerial eﬀort and therefore better
management practices. The model allows for exogenous heterogeneity in man-
agerial ability and optimal choice of contracts thereby combining both elements
discussed in section II in the text. In this set-up we can show that conditional
on a given number of ﬁrms, an increase in product substitutability (which is
how we index higher product market competition) will, in general, have an am-
biguous eﬀect on managerial incentives. When competition increases there is
a positive ("business stealing")e ﬀect on managerial eﬀort from the fact that
market share will be more sensitive to changes in managerial eﬀort (changes
in costs will have larger eﬀects in more competitive industries). There is also,
however, a negative ("scale")e ﬀect on managerial incentives because each ﬁrm
will be earning lower proﬁts so any given increase in market share will have
a smaller impact on proﬁts (and therefore on managerial compensation) in a
highly competitive industry compared to a less competitive industry. This is
one of the standard "Schumpeterian" reasons for the negative impact of higher
product market competition on innovation.
Allowing the number and type of entrants to be endogenous, however, changes
this conclusion. The second "scale" eﬀect noted above implies that when prod-
uct substitutability increases, proﬁts per ﬁrm fall for a given number of ﬁrms.
Because of this fewer ﬁrms will therefore choose to enter the market so in the
long-run average ﬁrm size increases. Because ﬁrms are larger the scale eﬀect
reinforces the business stealing eﬀect so managerial incentives always improve
following increases in product market competition arising from an increase in
product substitutability.
E1. Order of the Game
Consider the following ﬁve stage game
1. Entry
There are a large number of potential entrants who are considering paying
a sunk cost s to enter an industry. Each ﬁrm consists of a risk neutral principal
and a risk averse agent. A continuous number of n ﬁrms choose to enter. There
is free entry and exit.
12. Costs and Contracts
Each ﬁrm i has constant marginal cost
ci = c − ei − ui (1)
where ei is managerial eﬀort, ui is the cost shock (which we consider to be
unobserved managerial ability) and c is a positive constant. Assume that ui is
distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ2. The cost shock is only
revealed after the ﬁrm has chosen to enter as managers are unsure of their ability
ex ante. Eﬀort is unobservable to the principal so the ﬁrm can only contract on
ci.
Each principal oﬀers a linear contract to the agent with a total compensation
of
wi = si + bi(c − ci) (2)
where si is salary and bi is a piece rate that will generate a bonus that
depends on the observed cost reduction (c − ci).
3. Eﬀort Choice






where r is the constant absolute risk aversion. Given the normality of the
cost shocks maximizing utility is equivalent to maximizing









Agents accept any contract that has expected utility above the reservation level
that we normalize to zero.
4. Price Competition
After agents choose eﬀort, the principal observes costs (which is assumed
to also be private information to each ﬁrm). Firms then simultaneously choose
price to maximize expected proﬁt.
5. Demand
We use a Salop (1979) circular city model. The circle is populated by a
continuum of consumers with a uniform density of m. Each consumer buys one
unit (variety) of the good produced by one ﬁrm. If a consumer located at x
purchases from ﬁrm i located at zi she gets utility
Ui(x)=y + a − pi − t(x − zi)2 (5)
where y is income, a is utility of consuming the most preferred variety (x)
and t(x − zi)2 is the disutility associated with consuming variety z instead.
E2. Regularity assumptions
2To make the analysis tractable and ensure an equilibrium be need to make
some assumptions:
A. Upper Bound to the number of ﬁrms, n = am/F.
B. σ2 <t 2/(3n4).
C. 2kt(1 + krσ2) > nm.
Conditions A and B ensures that one ﬁrm’s cost is never so low it captures
the entire market of its neighbor. This enables us to solve for a symmetric
interior equilibrium. Condition C rules out the "escalation" eﬀects of Sutton
(1991) that imply as a market gets large ﬁrms may start investing in cost re-
ducing investments that cause the number of entrants to fall.
E3. Equilibrium
We solve the model through backward induction. At stage 4, a ﬁrm’s optimal
















In a symmetric equilibrium, the expected price E(p) must equal the expres-
























The agent maximizes utility with respect to eﬀort and chooses ei = bi/k.
One can then calculate the salary necessary to obtain an expected utility of
zero. at the contracting stage a ﬁrm chooses a piece rate b to maximize expected
proﬁt net of agents total compensation. We then obtain at stage 2 the Nash





At Stage 1 ﬁrms will calculate the expected value of entering the industry
net of set-up costs. Note that b is increasing in output (m/n) and decreasing in












What is the eﬀect of increasing product market competition (i.e. a fall in t)?
First, conditional on a given market structure diﬀerentiating (7) with respect




[ci − E(p)]n2 − t
2nt
(12)
Notice that ci−E(p) < 0, so equation (12) is negative. Also notice that this
expression is increasing in t and decreasing in E(p).
The incentive to reduce costs
∂πi(ci,E(p))
∂ci is changed in two ways when com-
petition increases.
• Business stealing Eﬀect. Equation (12) is increasing in transport costs for
ag i v e nE(p). In other words as transport costs fall (i.e. substitutability
and competition increases) proﬁts become more sensitive to costs (a given
change in costs will have a more negative impact on proﬁts at lower levels
of transport costs). This will increase a ﬁrm’s incentives to reduce costs
through high powered incentive contracts so it will want to increase b.
• Scale Eﬀect. But as t falls E(p) will also fall. Lower expected prices will
cause a fall in a ﬁrm’s own prices and this reduces the proﬁts from any
given increase in market share engendered by higher managerial eﬀort.
Since the value of cutting costs is proportional to demand, piece rates also
fall as the ﬁrm will want to reduce b (see equation (10)).
In this model the two eﬀects perfectly oﬀset each other (aggregate demand
is insensitive to price). In general, however, the eﬀect of increased competition
on incentives is ambiguous (e.g. Hart, 1983, Nickell, 1996, Schmidt, 1997).
Long run
Falling transport costs will reduce entry as there are less proﬁts to be
earned1. Since there are fewer ﬁrms they will all have greater individual de-
mand. This means that there is a positive scale eﬀect on incentives which
reinforces the positive business stealing eﬀect. To see this diﬀerentiate (11)


















1Aggregate proﬁts fall even though there is an oﬀsetting "Demsetz" type eﬀect arising from
the fact that competitive markets allocate more production to the lower cost (and therefore
more proﬁtable) ﬁrms. Assumption B assures that the main eﬀect of shrinking price cost
margins for all is greater than this reallocation eﬀect.
4Both of these terms are negative because of assumptions B and C respec-
tively. Consequently the value of entry is decreasing in n and increasing in t.
Consequently a fall in transport costs will generate fewer ﬁrms in equilibrium.
From (10) we know that b is increasing as the number of ﬁrms falls. This implies
that each individual ﬁrm will induce greater managerial eﬀort through setting
a higher piece rate when product substitutability increases.
It can also be shown that a larger market size, m, will be associated with
more ﬁrm entry but that average ﬁrm size will still rise (as competition has
eﬀectively increased). Since m/n is higher there will be a higher b and therefore
more managerial eﬀort in this case, too. On the other hand, lower barriers to
entry increase competition but reduce scale. This will mean that marginal costs
are higher (lower b induces less managerial eﬀort) although welfare can still be
shown to be higher as prices fall to oﬀset this form increased competition.
E5. Conclusions
The purpose of this Appendix was to examine the relationship between prod-
uct market competition and management in the context of a simple model that
allows "optimal" choice of managerial practices (in this case managerial eﬀort)
when there is heterogeneity in managerial ability. It therefore combines elements
of both of the "pure" models discussed in Section II of the main text.
We have shown in the context of this simple model that the intuition that
tougher market competition will generally improve management practices (ef-
fort) in the long-run is correct. The relationship is, however, ambiguous in the
s h o r t - r u nw h e nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms is ﬁxed. This set-up can be generalized in
various directions and the general ﬁnding of a positive impact of competition on
managerial eﬀort (or equivalently non-tournament process R&D) is reasonably
robust (see Vives, 2005).
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